Why did the struggle against apartheid become violent?

Police Attack Demonstrators in Sharpeville, March 21, 1960

Apartheid, meaning "apartness" in Afrikaans, refers to the system of racial segregation enforced in South Africa between 1948 and the mid-1990s. Though formally introduced by the National Party in 1948, racial segregation had long been part of South Africa’s history. Apartheid laws imposed severe restrictions on the daily lives of non-white South Africans, from "pass laws" that required them to carry permits to enter white-only areas, to the 1970 Bantu Homeland Citizenship Act, which stripped black South Africans of their citizenship. Resistance to apartheid existed throughout its history, with groups like the African National Congress (ANC) and Pan-Africanist Congress (PAC) leading the opposition. Initially, these movements focused on peaceful protests, but as police brutality escalated—most notably during the Sharpeville massacre—resistance became more violent. This shift was influenced by global social movements of the 1960s and 70s, including the American Civil Rights Movement and the Algerian War of Independence. These broader struggles for equality helped shape the growing unrest within South Africa as apartheid became increasingly unsustainable.

The ANC was revived in 1940 under the leadership of Albert Luthuli and with assistance from Nelson Mandela, Oliver Tambo and Walter Sisulu. They mostly organised smaller-scale peaceful protests, but in 1952 they expanded the size of their demonstrations. With support from the South African Indian Congress, thousands partook in a “defiance campaign” over the year, in which people presented themselves for arrest at police stations, and publicly burnt their passbooks. Not only did such a large and long demonstration bring their cause further into the public eye, the more arrests made, the more the economy would suffer, as often black and other non-white South Africans worked in industry or labour-based jobs, as these were deemed “appropriate” for their race. Despite the larger scale of this protest, many were becoming increasingly dissatisfied with the impact (or lack thereof) of these non-violent measures. Stephen Ellis notes that “even in those days, some South Africans talked about taking up arms”. Thula Simpson further notes that “by the mid-1950s several of the younger generation of ANC leaders… were anticipating… armed struggle at some future point” showing how in addition to being wanted by some members of the apartheid opposition, many also felt it to be an inevitable next step for the movement to progress. Non-violent measures and protests were simply not having enough of an effect; the apartheid legislation was still in place and was as restrictive as it had always been. The most that seemed to come out of events such as the defiance campaign in 1952 was mass arrests of resistance group members, which arguably did more harm to the movement than good, as it was difficult to organise these protests when many of the key members were locked away. Despite the sense that armed struggle was inevitable in the fight against apartheid, a view shared by Mandela and Sisulu, the practicalities of such a struggle were more complicated. Few, if any members of resistance groups had military experience, and weapons were almost impossible to get hold of. Yet in the 1960s, this all changed.

On the 21st of March 1960, the PAC organised a protest in Sharpeville. The protest was supposed to be another non-violent demonstration against the pass laws. After a sizeable crowd had gathered, they advanced to the police station to present themselves for arrest for either simply not carrying their passes, or for having destroyed them. The crowd chanted freedom songs and their campaign slogans. Initially, the white policemen refused to let them into the station, but after continued chanting, they relented. At around midday, a small scuffle broke out in which one policeman was accidentally knocked over. Consequently, one of the other policemen panicked and without warning opened fire on the near 5000 strong crowd, prompting his colleagues to do the same. This resulted in 69 fatalities and a further 180 seriously injured. Whilst the police later claimed it was in response to violence from the protestors, eyewitness accounts said that there was no warning given and protestors were shot in the back as they were fleeing the scene, implying that after the original shot, the police did not consider why or even if firepower was needed.  This event sparked outrage across the country, leading to further protests that became more violent. It also increased the volume and gravity of discussions around an armed struggle, which began to be even more seriously considered following the banning of the ANC on the 8th of April of the same year.

It is in this way that the Sharpeville massacre is often seen to have been a turning point in the struggle against apartheid; where the movement seriously began to change its approach from peaceful protests to armed demonstrations. This view is given by Joe Slovo, who was a strategist for the South African Communist Party. He said that it was “when the ruling class [read, white South Africans] made clear its intention of smashing black opposition totally… when it finally sealed off the avenues for effective opposition without the element of armed force”.The historian Tom Ellis also notes that Sharpeville was considered a significant event in the struggle against apartheid, inspiring a “school of radical historiography… that projected the crisis as a critical staging point in a journey towards revolutionary change”. Nelson Mandela too viewed Sharpeville as a turning point in the struggle against apartheid. In a small press conference from a safe house he declared “If the government reaction is to crush by naked force our non-violent struggle, we will have to reconsider our tactics. In my mind, we are closing a chapter on this question of a non-violent policy”.

This desire for revolutionary change following Sharpeville can be seen in the creation of the armed wing of the ANC in 1961. Umkhonto we Sizwe (or MK as it came to be known) took its name from the Zulu and Xhosa words for “Spear of the Nation” and was a collaboration between the ANC and the South African Communist Party (SACP). It was initially led by Mandela, and despite next to no military experience in the group, they planned for the first of their sabotage attacks to take place in December 1961. It was veteran Jack Hobson who advised MK on how they might go about these attacks, as he had experience with making and using explosives. Even though this was a clear move towards an armed struggle and violent protest, “instructions were issued to avoid attacks that would lead to injury or loss of life”, the idea was to attack government buildings and installations only, not harm citizens, whatever race. The PAC also had an armed faction led by Mlami Makwetu. This faction was nicknamed Poqo (from the Xhosa word for pure) by its followers, demonstrating a contrast between this faction and their opposition, who were not seen as “pure” followers of the cause due to their friendships with white liberals. The eagerness for revolutionary change and an armed struggle in the anti-apartheid battle is made clear in a recruitment leaflet distributed by Makwetu’s faction in December 1961.

“We are starting again, Africans… we die once. Africa will be free on January 1st. The white people will suffer, the black people will rule. Freedom comes after bloodshed. Poqo has started. It needs a real man. The Youth has weapons so you need not be afraid. The PAC says this.”

This leaflet also demonstrates the influence and involvement of youth groups in the movement, in particular their desire to make the struggle against apartheid an armed one, by collecting weapons themselves and collaborating with the more radical arms of the PAC. Throughout history, young people, especially university students, have been actively involved in social and cultural revolutions; take for example the Red Guards and the Cultural Revolution in Maoist China. Apartheid South Africa was no different.  Andrew Masondo, an academic who went on to become a leading member of both the ANC and the SACP respectively, recalled that even before the events in 1960 “a group of us [students] at Fort Hare [university] formed a group to prepare for the eventuality of an armed struggle”. Groups such as this were formed around the country. One of the first groups formed was the Soweto Student Representative Council (SSRC). Its main goals were to protest the use of Afrikaans in African schools and to organise student action against the increasing police brutality that erupted following the Sharpeville massacres. It became apparent fairly quickly, however, that if they wanted to challenge the ruling authorities successfully, they could not do so on their own. Thus, the group began trying to incorporate the working classes. Initially, they did so by simply preventing them from going to work, but before long they were active participants in the strikes, as many students spread their cause amongst their parents and other family members.

Between the 23-27th of August 1976, a strike took place in Soweto, organised by the ANC but supported by the SSRC. Archie Mafeje described this strike as an “unqualified success”.  Despite violence and intimidation from the police and migrant workers coerced into changing rank, a second strike was planned for September the same year. Mafeje recalls the SSRC distributing leaflets throughout Soweto “in Zulu, Sotho and English” encouraging workers to strike for 3 days. By sending out leaflets in the three main languages of the region, the students enabled a wider group of people to hear about the strike. This was a great success, as roughly 500, 000 people in the area responded in favour of the strike, making this one larger than the one in August. It even reached workers in Cape Town, who came out in support of the movement. It wasn’t just university students either; in August of 1976, a protest conducted by school children in the Cape Peninsula lasted for 3 weeks, and the unrest resulted in “at least 92 deaths”. The fact that schoolchildren were now being shot at, made many who had previously been against an armed struggle realise its necessity.

Resentment towards the apartheid legislation was, understandably, rife throughout South Africa. It is also clear that dissatisfaction with the non-violent protests, which achieved moderate success at best, had been bubbling under the surface throughout the 1950s. Thus, when the white government and police began to use force to shut down these peaceful protests, violence and an armed struggle against apartheid became the only option. The fact that schoolchildren were not exempt from being shot at by police increased the need for an armed struggle and brought it to the forefront of the campaign. The existing context of social upheaval and violent protests both in Africa as a continent and across the globe undoubtedly increased the desire for an armed struggle and the belief that it was the only way to progress the movement. As Mandela said when on trial in 1964, “Without violence there would be no way… to succeed in [the] struggle against… white supremacy”.

Bibliography

“Nelson Mandela’s statement from the dock at the opening of the defence case in the Rivonia Trial,” April 20, 1964, African National Congress website, [Accessed 1 May 2022]

Elliot Mfaxa, P.L. Gqobose, interviewed by Gail Gerhart, Maseru, 29 December 1969

Ellis, Stephen. “The Genesis of the ANC’s Armed Struggle in South Africa 1948-1961”, Journal of South African Studies, 37:4 (2011), pp.657-676

Friedman, Steven. “The Sounds of Silence: Structural Change and Collective Action in the Fight against Apartheid”, South African Historical Journal, 69:2 (2017), pp.236-250

James Ciment, “South Africa: Anti Apartheid Struggle, 1948-1994”, in James Ciment (ed.), Encyclopedia of Conflicts Since World War II, (Oxon, 2015), pp.282-291

Landau, Paul S. “The ANC, MK and 'The Turn to Violence’ (1960-1962)”, South African Historical Journal, 64:3 (2012), pp.538-563

Mafeje, Archie. “Soweto and its Aftermath”, Review of African Political Economy, 11 (1978), pp.15-30

Sharpeville Massacre, 21 March 1960, South Africa History Online, <https://www.sahistory.org.za/article/sharpeville-massacre-21-march-1960> [Accessed 30 April 2022]

Simpson, Thula. “Mandela’s Army: Urban Revolt in South Africa, 1960-1964”, Journal of South African Studies, 45:6 (2018), pp.1093-1110

Simpson, Thula. “Nelson Mandela and the Genesis of the ANC’s Armed Struggle: Notes on Method”, Journal of Southern African Studies, 44:1 (2018), pp.133-148

Statement from Anti-Apartheid Movement, Re: recent Developments in Southern Africa, March 21, 1984. Alexander Street, <https://search.alexanderstreet.com/view/work/bibliographic_entity%7Cbibliographic_details%7C3980502> [Accessed 28 April 2022]

Stephen Ellis. External Mission: the ANC in exile, 1960-1990, (New York, 2013)

The Editors of Encyclopaedia Britannica, "apartheid", in Encyclopaedia Britannica,<https://www.britannica.com/topic/apartheid> . [Accessed 30 April 2022].

Tom Lodge, Sharpeville: An Apartheid Massacre and its Consequences, (Oxford, 2011

uMkhonto weSizwe (MK), South African History Online,< https://www.sahistory.org.za/article/umkhonto-wesizwe-mk> [Accessed 30 April 2022]