What made the Roman army of the Republic (290 - 130 BC) so effective?

This writing will focus predominantly on the First and the Second Punic Wars (264-146 BCE), in which the Roman Army fought against the Carthaginian empire, resulting in a great Roman victory. Through understanding the reasons for success, one can comprehensively explain the effectiveness of the Roman Army, with an impetus on three key factors. The first was that of equipment - strong weaponry and amour enabled successes within hand-to-hand fighting and a great change in the effectiveness of cavalry forces, demonstrated within the African Campaign of the Second Punic War (218-201 BC).The effectiveness can also be seen in strategy and tactics with an overall emphasis on 'Fabian Tactics', being that of avoiding battle to deprive the opposition of resources.[1] On the battlefield came further success with the adoption of Hannibal’s tactics further into the campaign leading the Roman Army to victory. However, the role of the state shows this effectiveness to the greatest extent. The Roman 'culture of training and discipline', as explained by J.C.N Coulston, along with the abundance of manpower were required to allow these earlier factors to flourish through continued supply chains whilst Hannibal and the Carthaginian forces overextended.[2]

A strong argument from Coulston suggests that the Roman Army were to devise a combination of armour and weapons, which can be seen in the equipment held by the Roman legionary, the main infantryman of the Roman Army.[3] The typical legionaries typically carried short swords, spears or a pilum, a close-range bendable javelin. Combined with a shield and iron-plated armour, these weapons enabled the Roman Army to excel in hand-to-hand combat, convincingly defeating other infantry forces, such as those in the Hellenistic kingdoms. In this respect, it can be shown clearly the Romans had effective weaponry, yet the impact should not be overestimated. Some Carthaginian armies fought with similar weapons, also using javelins and swords, showing the effect of this factor in deciding this war is limited. Furthermore, one must not forget they were produced in mass by the Roman state, with fabricae throughout Italy serving as the main production hubs, such as Sicily providing equipment for the African Campaign. In relation to this, an Egyptian papyrus appears to depict the daily output for a Roman Forge, with around 10 swords made each day, depicting the scale of the production line.[4] The huge impact of the production of weaponry in this earlier form of warfare can be seen in the military targets chosen by the Roman Army, In the west Carthago Nova was a centre of production for Carthaginian armies operating in Spain and Italy. Its capture by Scipio Africanus in 210 BC not only left the armies without a key production line but it also was redirected towards aiding the Roman Army, which appears to be a strong factor in the victory within Africa. Thus, the Roman Army was effective as it had an efficient manufacturing process, meaning the state had a greater impact on the outcomes of war.

More importantly, however, the Roman historian Polybius wrote the cavalry within the Roman Army went through big changes within this period of history.[5] Taking inspiration from the Greek cavalry of the time, the Roman Army adapted theirs to have a foundation based on amour and heavy weaponry, having seen a lighter approach result in too much exposure to danger. This change included armour, stronger shields and a completely new lance, which was heavier for steadiness and had a spike on the butt end in case it snapped mid-battle. As a result, this created a new dimension on the battlefield, seen most convincingly in the Battle of Zama, where Scipio’s cavalry forces took Hannibal’s from the rear and completely destroyed them (a tactic taken from Hannibal himself). Not only does this show to a good extent the effectiveness of the new Roman cavalry in the factor of weaponry, but it also gives impetus to the effectiveness of the Roman strategy and tactics. This use of cavalry effectively decided the Second Punic War, as the Carthaginians applied for peace soon after.

The effectiveness of the Roman tactics at Zama should be praised but must be recognized as a great battle winner without determining the entire campaign. The overall strategy of the Roman Army appears to have had a much greater effect on the outcome of the Punic Wars. During the Italian campaign in the Second Punic War, the Roman Dictator Fabius employed the policy of strategic non-engagement and this 'Fabian Strategy' left Hannibal without a permanent base of operations, thus depriving him of supplies. Despite a huge defeat at Cannae for the Roman Army in 216, Hannibal was unable to push further towards Rome, as he had to consolidate his position in Northern Italy. As a result of desertion, Gaul's attacks and conditions, Hannibal lost over half his men crossing into Italy. Due to this, Hannibal was unable to attack a weakened Roman force, who were able to replenish their troops and supplies, leading to a war-deciding victory at Mataurus. Thus, this defensive tactic was effective throughout this period as it enabled Rome to able to supply a whole new army whilst Hannibal could not – this difference in manpower came because of this strategy.

This manpower advantage shows further the effectiveness of training and recruitment in the Roman Army, which was relied on to use this defensive strategy, thus showing the importance of the role of the state. Coulson concludes that there were 3 main reasons for the Roman Armies' effectiveness, explaining two were related to this point, 'military training and binding of discipline'.[6] Roman males were prepared from birth for military service, training from youth in sports and other forms of education. Once conscripted, they participated in a vigorous program that started with physical labouring and led to weapon and discipline training until they were required to serve, leading to a highly trained army. This argument appears successful in relation to the importance of preparation for war yet is somewhat limited as fails to take into account the effectiveness of the Roman Army in the operations themselves. Despite this, Stout adds the Roman soldiers had to agree to an 'oath of enlistment',[7] promising loyalty and obedience to his commander, putting in word this binding of discipline that Coulson describes, as those unwilling to serve would be punished with death. As a result, the Roman conscript would show more effective obedience, leading to tactics being used more effectively than the other forces, leading to greater effectiveness in battle.

Furthermore, the manpower advantage was clear within this war which highly increased the effectiveness of the Roman army. Polybius estimated by the start of the Second Punic War, the civilian service was over 200,000.[8] It seemed the civilians bought into the ideology of the Roman Army in ideas of self-defence and patriotism. This shows the significance of war within the Roman State, as those recruited were enthusiastic and conscription was mostly a popular notion. Combined with the highly trained officers, this created a strong-willed and highly-trained Roman army. This comes in stark contrast to the Carthaginian forces, who were reduced in number due to desertion from allies, such as Libyan and Spanish troops, who did not have this loyal culture to warfare. So, the state was able to promote pride and belligerence towards the Carthaginian forces to create an overwhelming force, showing to a great extent the effectiveness within this period came down to manpower and willpower created by the Roman state.

The overwhelming consensus shows that the Roman Army was so effective due to three main factors. The new weaponry provided an advantage in hand-to-hand combat whilst the cavalry was massively improved leading to a decisive victory at the Battle of Zama, used effectively in the new tactics shown at the battle. On a larger scale, the Roman Army adopted a defensive strategy which led to an advantage as they had a continuous supply line, whilst Hannibal appeared to overextend within the Punic Wars. However, showing effectiveness to the greatest extent, the Roman state was able to provide the manpower in order to put the weaponry and the strategies into place, in order to achieve victories in Italy, Spain and Africa against the Carthaginian forces under Hannibal within this period.

Further Reading

Basar, P and Bishop, J, The Arms and Armor of the Punic Phoenicians, (2021) https://phoenicia.org/carthagearmor.html - accessed 19/08/21

Bishop, M., & Coulston, J. The Republican Period. In <i>Roman Military Equipment from the Punic Wars to the Fall of Rome, second edition (Oxford; Havertown, PA: Oxbow Books, 2006)

Bruckner, A and Marichal, R, Chartae Latinae Antiquiores, X, Germany I, (Zurich, 1979)

Coulston, J. Courage and Cowardice in the Roman Imperial Army, War in History, 20,1, (2013), Retrieved August 23, 2021, from http://www.jstor.org/stable/26098641

The Editors of Encyclopaedia Britannica, Punic Wars, (2021), https://www.britannica.com/event/Punic-Wars/Second-Punic-War-218-201-bce - accessed 22/08/21

Elliott, S, Why was the Roman Army so successful in warfare? History Hit Podcast, (2019), https://www.historyhit.com/why-was-the-roman-army-so-successful-in-warfare/ - accessed 22/08/21

Polybius, The Roman Military System - The Histories – 264BC-146BC, (1970) https://penelope.uchicago.edu/Thayer/e/roman/texts/polybius/6*.html – accessed 23/08/21

Stout, S. Training Soldiers for the Roman Legion. The Classical Journal,16(7), (1921), Retrieved August 23, 2021, from http://www.jstor.org/stable/3288082

Williamson, M, Recruiting in the Roman Republic, Weapons and Warfare, (2020) https://weaponsandwarfare.com/2020/12/11/recruiting-in-the-roman-republic/ - accessed 23/08/21

[1] Polybius, (1970), The Roman Military System - The Histories – 264BC-146BC, VI 19-30. (1970) https://penelope.uchicago.edu/Thayer/e/roman/texts/polybius/6*.html – accessed 21/08/21 [2] M.C Bishop and J.C.N Coulston, The Republican Period, Roman Military Equipment from the Punic Wars to the Fall of Rome, second edition, (Oxford; Havertown, PA: Oxbow Books, 2006), 48-72 [3]Bishop and Coulston, Roman Military Equipment from the Punic Wars to the Fall of Rome, 61 [4] A. Bruckner and R. Marichal (ed.), Chartae Latinae Antiquiores, X, Germany I, (Zurich, 1979) [5] Polybius, The Histories, VI 19-30 [6] J.C.N, Coulston, Courage and Cowardice in the Roman Imperial Army. War in History, 20(1), 7-31, (2013), Retrieved August 23, 2021, from http://www.jstor.org/stable/26098641 [7] S.E. Stout, Training Soldiers for the Roman Legion, The Classical Journal,16(7), (1921), 423-431. Retrieved August 23, 2021, from http://www.jstor.org/stable/3288082 [8]Polybius, The Histories