Dissertation : Rommel and Propaganda: How Wartime Narratives Shaped the Legacy of the Desert Fox

No German General from the Second World War was publicized in wartime propaganda as often or as positively as Erwin Rommel. The Nazi Propagandaministerium (Pro-Mi) worked tirelessly to present Rommel as the face of the Afrikakorps and elevate his status to that of a national hero. His victories in the North African theatre of war, from 1941-42, also brought him recognition and praise from his Commonwealth opponents, particularly the British press. After being implicated in the failed 1944 plot to overthrow Adolf Hitler, Rommel was given the choice between facing trial or taking his own life. He chose the latter. In a series of favourable bibliographies that followed, the most famous being Desmond Young’s Rommel: The Desert Fox, a narrative was created of an ’exceptional general’ and a ‘good German’ who valued military ethos and became a victim of Nazi Germany after becoming disillusioned with Adolf Hitler’s leadership.[1] This narrative became more popularly known as the ‘Rommel myth’.[2] This study is important because Rommel’s special relationship with propaganda has been largely underdeveloped in the scholarly work on the Rommel myth. While previous historians have acknowledged that Rommel was a propaganda figure, they have not fully explored how wartime media actively shaped the myth of the 'Desert Fox'. The unresolved nature of propaganda's role has arisen because much of the historiography has typically been written in the form of bibliographies, often with a limited source base. This dissertation intends to uncover some of the motives that led to the creation of the Rommel myth, which can be best determined through a nuanced analysis of wartime newspapers, supplemented with historical documentation from key actors in this period.

There is an extensive biographical history of Erwin Rommel. The earliest written work appeared in the decade after the Second World War, unilaterally emphasizing admiration for the military genius of the ‘Desert Fox’, with writers often influenced by their own experiences with Rommel. Desmond Young produced Rommel: The Desert Fox in 1950, which gave an uncritical and laudatory view of Rommel, including a foreword from Field Marshall Claude Auchinleck, who saluted him as both a ‘soldier and a man’.[3] Wartime journalist Basil Liddell Hart further laid the foundation for the myth surrounding Rommel as he introduced the Rommel Papers under no doubt that Rommel was a ‘Great Captain’.[4] In Germany, Hans Speidel, Rommel’s former chief of staff, had written in 1946 that he planned to turn Rommel into ‘the hero of the German People’ and wrote of the Field Marshal being a ‘master of intuition and lively improvisation on the battlefield’ in Invasion 1944.[5] By depicting Rommel as this ‘good German’, the early perspective sought to aid in reconciliation between Germany and Britain by portraying Rommel, and thus the Wehrmacht in a positive light. This rehabilitation through the honourable persona of the Field Marshal was accepted gratefully in view of the war that was characterized by hate. The early Rommel myth was also favourable due to an incomplete source base, which became more contested with greater access to German material in the mid-1970s.

The historiography of the mid-1970s first suggested that wartime propaganda played a crucial role in forming the myth. Wolf Heckmann’s Rommels Kreig in Afrika (1976) offers a brief conclusion that Goebbels and Montgomery helped contruct the image of the ‘Desert Fox’, making Rommel a global name.[6] The use of the term ‘combat propaganda’ is first noted in David Irving’s Rommel: The Trail of the Fox and provides the first depiction of Rommel working in collaboration with the Nazi Propaganda Minister, Joseph Goebbels, that led to the emergence of a kind of Rommel cult.[7] Whilst David Irving is a proven manipulator of historical documentation and thus should not be trusted, a distinction should be made between collector and collection.[8] Irving brought to light a collection of diaries, archival documents and interviews that created a more complete source base surrounding Rommel and thus, should still be cited with caution. The translation of The Goebbels Diaries into English by Louis Lochner (1948) and Fred Taylor (1982) also gave a greater insight into the working of the Propaganda Ministry in Nazi Germany. The diaries provide extensive personal memoirs of Goebbels, left behind as learning materials for future generations of Nazis. Although these diaries function as works of propaganda, they also contain revealing remarks on Rommel's marketing.

More recent historiography, such as Ralf Georg Reuth’s Rommel: The End of a Legend (2005), utilised newly available German sources, including the Goebbels Diaries to critically assess Rommel’s role in Nazi propaganda. Using the voices of key actors, Reuth’s critical assessment challenges that Rommel was a tool of Nazi propaganda, used as a ‘symbol of German perseverance and confidence in victory’, a portrayal exacerbated by the British generals and their press.[9] Peter Caddick-Adams similarly concluded that the creation of the ‘Desert Fox’ was made possible because the entire Third Reich was a ‘sandcastle illusion built on propaganda’.[10] However, while both argue that Rommel was used as a propaganda weapon and a diversionary tactic to distract from Germany’s failures in the Soviet Union in 1941-42, they provide limited concrete evidence to support this claim. Reuth’s argument is based on the notion that Goebbels planned to ‘elevate (Rommel) to a kind of national hero’ but relies on the assumption that reports on North Africa were used to counterbalance harmful news from Russia to make this argument persuasive.

As far as British propaganda is concerned, with a larger available source base, the attention given to Rommel is more clear-cut. The main argument from the Rommel historiography is that British propagandists were able to provide Winston Churchill with a credible alibi for failures in the desert. Irving noted that Britain publicized Rommel’s invincibility ‘as a way to explain their failures, then to make their victories over him seem worth that much more’ whilst Reuth argued that the British ‘found it useful to portray the German general as a virtual superman to justify British reverses in North Africa’, specifically Rommel’s unexpected victories in Cyrenaica and Tobruk. [11],[12] Nevertheless, these studies are not comprehensive on the British media narrative and tend to cite Churchill’s quote about Rommel being a ‘great general’ as the key argument for inflating Rommel’s reputation in Britain.[13] Douglas Porch’s more extensive narrative argued that Rommel was a ‘much greater boon for British propaganda than for the Germans’ as he put a face to the enemy and elevated the Mediterranean in the minds of the British and American public to the status of a major theatre.[14] A recent study by Joseph Campo, titled Desert Fox or Hitler Favourite? focuses on the portrayal of Rommel by American and British media during the Second World War. His invaluable in-depth analysis of mass media presents that Rommel’s portrayal by Allied media was ‘dynamic and transformed over time as the political and military landscape of the war changed’.[15] By the end of the war, the narrative on Rommel had shifted to his alleged political career as a ‘fanatical Nazi’ fond of ‘sleeping in front of Hitler’s front door’.[16] Campo appears to take the Rommel myth to a modern conclusion, which accepts that there are still different and contradictory views of Rommel, as there were during the war.

Thus, the relationship between Rommel and propaganda remains largely confined to biographical accounts that do not explore the topic in depth, particularly from a German perspective. This dissertation aims to provide a more nuanced analysis of how wartime propaganda aided in the creation of the Rommel myth. It will employ the modern concept of collective memory to examine how wartime newspapers shaped public perceptions of Rommel in Germany and Britain. As first defined by Maurice Halbwachs in La Mémoire Collective (The Collective Memory), collective memory is the idea that there is a group memory that exists outside of and lives beyond the individual, whether they experienced it or not.[17] To this extent, these groups can be as large as a nation-state. Thus, through the national release of newspapers, as memories are gained and shared around, a common past is created. In the case of Rommel, we can use newspapers to understand how these portrayals differed and evolved over time, due to the divergence in collective memory amongst Germans and Britons. By studying national newspaper releases, this dissertation will assess how Rommel was portrayed to different audiences and to what extent his image was used to promote political and military goals. This approach will help to contextualize the influence of wartime discourse in the Rommel myth, an aspect often overshadowed by mass media portrayals such as Young’s The Desert Fox.

The first chapter of this project will focus on the publicization of Erwin Rommel by the Nazi Propaganda Ministry. This chapter will argue that whilst the Pro-Mi elevated Rommel to a legendary figure to highlight German military prowess, his principal value was to reiterate the ‘life-and-death struggle’ for victory, as Hitler once remarked. [18] This propaganda strategy is consistent in newspapers throughout the period 1940-44, significantly Rommel and his camaraderie with the common soldier, his bravery, and his ultimate coerced sacrifice. The second chapter will examine British portrayals of Rommel, challenging common misconceptions about the British media's role in creating the ‘Desert Fox’ legend. It will argue that the ‘legend of Rommel as an invincible genius’ grew from Rommel being a formidable opponent and through his innovations in warfare.[19] The final chapter will analyze perceptions of Rommel following the Axis capture of Tobruk (June 1942), using both German and British sources to explore how propaganda strategies varied, yet Rommel's military reputation remained a constant. Whilst arguably the Pro-Mi had no reason to boost Rommel’s legendary reputation further, depicting Rommel as a bold and daring commander was enough for the myth to reach its pinnacle amongst the British public, as British failures lent credibility to the notion that Rommel had pulled off a military masterpiece. Ultimately, this dissertation seeks to illuminate the impact of wartime propaganda in shaping Rommel’s legacy, offering a fresh perspective on the evolution of the Rommel myth.

Chapter One: Rommel in Nazi Propaganda

Palm trees and open deserts set the backdrop for a new grand adventure for Germany, with Erwin Rommel at the centre of all the action, posing in an open vehicle as the heroic head of the Afrikakorps (see Figure 1).[20]

Figure 1 - The 'Desert Fox’ leading his men, 1942.

This powerful image encapsulates the romanticism and glorification of the war effort, idealisms used proficiently by the Propagandaministerium. Rommel’s image of the model National Socialist general was delivered to the German masses via printed material, radio, and film. Propaganda Minister Joseph Goebbels capitalized on Rommel’s military successes by using them as opportunities for a propaganda victory and elevated Rommel to a ‘kind of national hero’.[21] Reuth argues that this meant ‘Rommel was ‘marketed’ like no other general of the Wehrmacht and a well-calculated programme made him into the idol of all Germans’.[22] Scholars, like Robert Citino, further suggest that whilst Rommel was used as an example to the nation in the years of victory but later became a necessary ‘diversion from increasingly bad news on other, more important fronts’.[23] This chapter will argue, however, that the narrative of Rommel remained relatively consistent from 1939-44. Rommel’s role in propaganda remained as an unswerving reminder of the struggle required for a German victory, which transitioned from his military contributions to his ‘sacrifice’ in October 1944.

Hitler's obsession with propaganda is relevant in Mein Kampf , whwere he dedicates two entire chapters to the subject, with ‘War Propaganda’ being particularly relevant to this study. He noted, after its successful application by the British in the First World War, it became ‘evident what immense results could be obtained by a correct application of propaganda’.[24] Hitler would later employ propaganda as a means to an end in the Second World War. It would support the German ‘struggle for existence; its aim to help bring about victory’’.[25] Joseph Goebbels was appointed as head of the Propaganda Ministry (Pro-Mi) in 1933, which united the departments of ‘press, radio, film theatre and propaganda’ into a single large-scale organization.[26] While officially tasked with enlightening ‘the populace as to the policies of the Reich government’, its true objective was the ‘mental mobilization’ of the masses, to ‘think uniformly’ and to ‘place themselves body and soul at the disposal of the government’.[27] By analysing Nazi propaganda, particulalrly newspaper articles, we can observe how Rommel’s portrayal consistently reinforced common themes within Nazi messaging.

Understanding Rommel’s prominence in propaganda also requires examining the ideological factors that facilitated his rise. Benoît Lemay notes that Rommel perfectly ‘represented the type of military commander who reflected Nazi principles’,[28] whilst Robert Citino’s depiction of Rommel as the ‘Prototype of the National Socialist army leader’ aligns with this interpretation.[29],[30] Hitler repeatedly asserts Aryan superiority in Mein Kampf , describing Aryans as ‘Prometheus of mankind from whose bright forehead the divine spark of genius has sprung’.[31] To Hitler, Rommel was the model Aryan, depicted as having ‘prominent cheekbones’ and ‘clear and blue eyes’.[32] Unsurprisingly, visual imagery played a key role in his characterisation, as seen in a portrait in the November issue of the Illustriertes Tageblatt (See Figure 2).[33]

Figure 2 - Portrait of Rommel

Rommel’s middle-class background also symbolized a departure from the Prussian aristocracy hierarchy, which had long dominated the German military hierarchy. As a result of both his ideological suitability and military achievements, Rommel became Hitler’s ‘favourite general’. [34] This reinforces the idea that Rommel was selected both for his military prowess and his propaganda utility. This may also explain why Goebbels made a significant effort to prioritise the marketing of Rommel as it would keep his good favour with Hitler. Some historians suggest that without these characteristics, Rommel might never have commanded beyond a regiment.[35] While this claim may be overstated given his military accomplishments, his physical traits and personality undoubtedly aligned with Nazi ideals.

Goebbels crafted a personal connection between the German civilian population and the war effort through the persona of Rommel, primarily via the written press. Despite wartime constraints on sources, a substantial range of newspapers remain available for analysis. This study focuses on Völkischer Beobachter, the flagship Nazi newspaper, supplemented by Der Freiheitskampf and Das Reich. Given that the editorial content within wartime Nazi newspapers becomes virtually indistinguishable, prioritizing Völkischer Beobachter provides a comprehensive insight into propaganda trends. The Völkischer Beobachter was an influential daily newspaper first published by the Nazi Party in the 1920s until their fall in 1945, its circulation peaking at 1.1 million in 1941.[36] In this respect, it plays a useful part in indicating Nazi policy shifts and propaganda objectives. While its content must be approached with caution due to inherent exaggerations, when supplemented with private statements from Hitler and Goebbels, it offers valuable insight into how German media narratives shaped public perceptions of Rommel.

The initial phase of Rommel’s public perception was shaped by his exploits in the Battle of France (May – June 1940). During the assault on Cherbourg, Rommel’s division moved ‘in one stride (24 hours) a distance of 220 to 230 miles’.[37] This earnt his 7th Panzer division the nickname Gespensterdivision, which ‘advanced through the night, appearing unexpectedly, and far behind enemy lines, with unreal graceful speed and manoeuvrability’.[38] In June 1940, the Reisaer Tageblatt credited Rommel and his Ghost Division for the 'rapid breakthrough of the Maginot line’.[39] Rommel’s early military successes were further mythologised in the soldier’s song, Auf der Rommelbahn nachts um halb drei.[40] Goebbels even introduced a new form of vocabulary. Rommeln, or to Rommel, described a daring advance deep into enemy territory.[41] Rommel was later seen in an issue of the Illustriertes Tageblatt in November 1940, headlined Das ist “Unser Rommel”.[42] In this report, a soldier of the Ghost Division comments on Rommel and his commitment to fighting at the front with his men, depicted here personally taking control of a German battery. A portrait of Rommel is also illustrated in this report; placing a face to Rommel’s actions aids in the creation of a popular military figure to aspire towards. This represents how Rommel’s successful military actions in France were exploited by the Pro-Mi to reinforce the idea that the war effort was led by capable and relatable leaders. The name ‘Rommel’ became a synonym for the invincibility of the German Wehrmacht into public consciousness with both words and images and became an example for the nation to follow during the years of his victories in France.

On February 6, 1941, Hitler appointed Rommel as commander of the new Afrikakorps. Two months later, after the surprise capture of Benghazi, Goebbels noted that Rommel was ‘doing a magnificent job’.[43] Despite front-page priority within the Völkischer Beobachter, Rommel's name was conspicuously absent. Days later, the important re-conquering of Cyrenaica was noted as a ‘wonderful’ victory in the Rommel Papers.[44] The Pro-Mi cared little. Rather, Goebbels had planned a front-page article on the British methods of political seduction, noted as Das Alte Lied, whilst stories of bombing raids covered the rest.[45] The next important military conflict was the first Siege of Tobruk, on April 10. Despite the significant achievement of surrounding Tobruk, yet again, German attention was elsewhere. European ventures in Griechenland and Serbien dominated the front pages. This attitude was reiterated within Goebbels’ diaries, as the situation in Africa often only received one line of information each day. Perhaps, as Goebbels noted ‘Rommel has already become a legendary figure’, he felt there was limited value in the continued promotion of Rommel.[46] Furthermore, at the start of 1942, The Neue Mannheimer Zeitung produced an article on the recapture of Benghazi by Rommel, noted as a glanzvolle Waffentat.[47] Whilst a significant victory in the African theatre, the main headline focussed on nine years of Arbeit, Erfolg und Sieg under the Nazi party which further reflected the priority of the Pro-Mi to focus on political indoctrination supplemented by military successes.[48] This early neglect of Rommel’s African campaign suggests that, for the Pro-Mi, Rommel was initially of secondary importance.

By the mid-1942, however, Rommel's victories became central to Nazi propaganda. Rommel was keenly attributed to the military success at the Battle of Gazala, with the headline depiction of a Rommel-Sieg, which also noted his taktische finessen.[49] Goebbels further orchestrated a cover article in Adler Im Süden that compared Rommel to some of the legendary military leaders of the past: ‘What would Sedan have been without Moltke, Tannenburg without Hindenburg, Waterloo without Blucher…. Where would the fight in North Africa be without the brilliant fencing artistry of General Rommel?’[50] In a similar vein, the Straßburger neueste Nachrichten compared Rommel to the legendary Roman general Scipio, earning the title ‘Aricanus’.[51] By tapping into the rich history of military heroism, the Nazis sought to create a new national hero who could serve the interest of the regime. This historical parallel reinforced Rommel's status as a national hero, legitimising the Nazi war effort and inspiring the German populace. Resultingly, the June victories of the African campaign appear as the pinnacle of Rommel’s marketing by Nazi propagandists, as his name became situated in legend.

The common view that Rommel came to the forefront of Nazi Propaganda to divert attention away from the precarious position in the Soviet Union, popularized by Ralf Georg Reuth, also must be questioned.[52] Amid Rommel’s successes of June 1942, the Völkischer Beobachter headlined Ein Jahr Kreig gegen Moskau. which echoed the fateful struggle against the Bolsheviks.[53] It further cited the ‘heroic deeds’ of the German soldier against the Soviet Union, the ‘most dangerous of all adversaries’.[54] This appears to heavily contradict the argument that Rommel was used as a diversionary tactic. At this point on the Russian front, Goebbels noted that ‘no one believes in the absolute victory of the Soviet Union, but also no one believes in a decisive German victory’.[55] This is significant as the Nazi regime believed that German victory was still possible but would require the maintenance of popular support for the war effort against the Soviet Union, which could be created through propaganda. Thus, it was important to reiterate more pressing concerns for the German people, such as the Soviet front, to emphasize the war effort as a struggle for the German nation. To simplify the role of Rommel in propaganda down to a diversionary tactic appears too limiting and takes away from what makes the Rommel myth such an interesting topic to study, the complex relationship between myth and reality.

This study must also note the relationship between Rommel and the German soldiers presented in newspaper reports. Rommel’s victories in June 1942 and his ‘great soldierly qualities’ are often accompanied by ‘recognition for his brave troops and their outstanding fighting spirit’.[56] A personal comment from Rommel read: ‘With such troops, and only with such troops, successes like these are achievable’.[57] The Nazi regime was based on promoting the collective efforts of the German military and people across class divides in a concept known as Volksgemeinschaft. The German mass media eulogized the creation of a true ‘national community’ that subjected the rights of the individual to those of the community in a way that entailed ‘unconditional sacrifice and the suspension of critical judgement’.[58] On Heldengedenktag 1942, Rommel was headlined alongside Hitler. It describes the image of Rommel becoming ‘an inner experience’ for the German population and becoming a character who speaks for resistance and the ‘will for victory’.[59] Goebbels also made sure to distance Rommel from the end of operations in North Africa, as association with the fall would be ‘harmful to his name’, which had future value in leading the war effort.[60] Accordingly, Nazi propaganda linked Rommel’s victories to the collective efforts of the common soldier, reinforcing the idea of a unified and disciplined Wehrmacht in service of the German nation. It also reiterated themes of heroism and sacrifice by portraying Rommel and his troops as brave and selfless.

The theme of sacrifice is evident in posthumous reports on Rommel. Robert Citino argues that when Rommel had no further purpose for Nazi propaganda, ‘the regime dropped him altogether and killed him’.[61] Whilst Citino does not add to this point, in 1944, Rommel had one last use for the Nazi propagandists. Hitler issued a statement on October 20, 1944, which attributed Rommel’s death to ‘serious injuries sustained during a drive to the front’.[62]This official narrative was widely circulated in Nazi-controlled newspapers, strategically reinforcing the idea that Rommel had made the ultimate sacrifice for Germany. By portraying him as the ‘epitome of outstanding bravery and fearless daredevilry’ in the ‘current struggle’, the Nazi regime sought to reframe his death as an inspiring call to arms rather than the result of political maneuvering.[63] The Pro-Mi capitalized on Rommel’s status as a beloved military figure, emphasizing that he ‘lived with them and fought for them (the German soldiers)’, a calculated effort to boost the morale of a war-weary nation.[64] This was valuable to the Nazi Party as the situation was becoming dire for Germany, as the reality of defeat ‘seeped into every corner of the Reich’ as the German state was pushed towards total war.[65] The Straßburger neueste Nachrichten also called for his memory to live long in German people as both an ‘obligation and an incentive’, specifically calling upon the youths to continue the struggle, whilst the uses of the motto KampfbiszumSiege within the article give further indication that Rommel was used as a martyr.[66] In this way, Rommel’s legend, actively shaped by Nazi propagandists in life, was perpetuated even after his death—an enduring tool of mythmaking that transcended the fall of the Third Reich.

Therefore, it can be argued that the persona of Rommel as a mythos was created and exploited by the Nazi Propaganda machine. Newspapers and writings provide evidence of how Rommel was marketed as a ‘national hero’ who embodied the model Nazi general, both physically and ideologically.[67] Essentially, Rommel was used twofold in Nazi propaganda; to highlight German military prowess, and to reiterate the Nazi struggle for victory, seen through his relationship with the common soldier, his bravery and ultimate coerced sacrifice. As a result, the collective memory of Rommel as a chivalrous and honourable general would strongly have incited the persistent post-war myth of a ‘Clean Wehrmacht’, which held that the German army was ‘unsullied by involvement in Nazi crimes’.[68] As the Pro-Mi had distanced Rommel from the Soviet war of extermination, his military prowess was untarnished by Nazi atrocities. Beyond immediate wartime propaganda, this strategic myth-making around Rommel’s death also contributed to the post-war 'Clean Wehrmacht' narrative. As the Nazi regime crumbled, the carefully constructed image of Rommel as an apolitical, noble soldier remained intact, making him an ideal figure for those seeking to distance the German military from Nazi war crimes. Thus, it becomes clear why Rommel was chosen as the face of the Wehrmacht in the fallout of the Second World War, as Germans attempted to distance themselves from the crimes of the Nazi regime.

Chapter Two: Rommel in British Propaganda

This chapter will delve into what has been commonly assumed but rarely investigated: Britain portrayed Rommel as the ’Desert Fox’ to deflect attention away from mistakes and miscalculations in North Africa and the inability to defeat the Afrikakorps.[69] In reality, there was a real substance and authenticity to British portrayals of Rommel and to dismiss them as wartime propaganda, as many historians have, would be a missed chance to present what it was about Rommel that made him an iconic military commander. As Britain was fighting nowhere else on land at this point, mistakes were generalised into larger strategic failures by the British press whilst Rommel became the blueprint for the British military to follow. Rommel also appeared to the British public to be an unbeatable general which resulted in a campaign to demystify Rommel in the late 1940s. Building upon Campo’s detailed and compelling analysis of how wartime narratives shaped the Rommel myth, this chapter will extend the discussion by incorporating a broader range of British newspaper sources. While Campo effectively demonstrates that wartime coverage laid the foundation for Rommel’s later legend, this study further explores how these narratives evolved from admiration to a deliberate effort to dismantle his status as an invincible general.[70] It will employ a greater scope of British newspaper articles, supplemented by the views of Rommel himself, which are authored in the Rommel Papers.

The British Ministry of Information (MoI) was activated in line with the outbreak of the war in September 1939. The MoI took it upon themselves to see the war brought to a successful conclusion by promoting ‘the national case to the public at home and abroad’ and issuing ‘National Propaganda’.[71] Two of the most common themes used by the MoI were ‘historical pride and patriotism’ and ‘national unity’.[72] Unlike the captive press in the Third Reich, the British press was comparatively free to formulate its own arguments and opinions as the MoI did not produce newspaper articles, rather it played a role in regulating and influencing the content used. Yet, for the purposes of this study, British newspapers still fit within the notion of wartime propaganda, as they were employed to promote a certain political point of view. Philip Taylor writes that this was achieved by the so-called ‘voluntary’ system that allowed news editors to submit any material they were unsure about to the MoI.[73] For the purposes of this dissertation, direct censorship by military authorities is important. Specifically, Defence Regulation 39b made it an offence to obtain or publish information on military matters ‘likely to prejudice the efficient prosecution of the war’.[74] As this study will argue, this censorship resulted in newspapers presenting Rommel as a formidable opponent but not as a hero to be admired.

During the war, newspapers were the British public’s primary source of information. At the peak of his fame in 1942, Rommel appeared almost daily in British papers. I have investigated the most prominent newspaper in this period, The Times, as well as including snippets from other newspapers such as The Daily Mirror and The Manchester Guardian. They provide an in-depth insight into the North Africa Campaign and as it was the only place the British Army was fighting in the years 1941- 42, it became the prime focus for British media. In The Times, from November 1941 and up until the end of 1942, Rommel is almost named daily in articles on the desert conflict, appearing 8 times in headlines through December 1941 and 12 times through January 1942. ‘Rommel’ is also typically chosen over the generalisation of the Axis forces in North Africa, seen in the headlines ‘Rommel Hits Back’ and ‘Rommel’s Advance’.[75] This may have chosen to highlight the public to the threat Rommel posed to the British military but more likely, knowing Rommel was well-known for his daring tactics, would attract public attention and interest. Rommel also won grudging praise and respect during his retreat to Agedabia in early 1942, as Daily Express correspondent Alan Moorehead wrote ‘You have to really be there to see their retreats. To claim that the Germans are beaten once they start to retreat is dangerous nonsense’.[76] This evidence presents that Rommel was already perceived as a well-known and formidable opponent ahead of the key battles at Gazala and Tobruk.

For the purposes of this study, the six months between January and June 1942 represent the crucial period when Rommel became known for his invincibility. This period marked half a year of uninterrupted victories for the Axis forces under the command of Rommel. The most famous of which opened with the Axis attack on the Gazala position on May 26, despite the ‘superior strength of the British force’.[77] By June 3, Rommel felt that the worst part of the battle was over and wrote to his wife, with whom he was very open, that ‘we’re in such a favourable position and I’ve got no more serious worries’.[78] It must be noted that Rommel was being somewhat optimistic as the British armour was still operational. Despite this, British newspapers wrote off Rommel and heavily overestimated their position. Headlines in early June 1942 read ‘Rommel Mauled, Turning Back’ and ‘Rommel’s Tanks Tackled’.[79] British commentators reported on a ‘glorious achievement’ along with ‘complete confidence at the front’ as the ‘desert is dotted with burning German tanks’.[80] This overestimation of British fortunes continued. On June 8, The Times informed the British public of ‘another definite repulse for Rommel’ who was ‘completely thwarted’ in the first phase of the ‘Battle of the Cauldron’.[81] This could not have been further from the truth, nor was the report from The Manchester Guardian which wrote that ‘British arms had won a victory which must ultimately have a decisive effect on the Battle for Libya’[82] As late as June 15, The Daily Mirror remarked that Rommel is ‘desperately gambling’ and that ‘The British are hitting back strongly’.[83] In stark contrast, Rommel wrote to Lucie on the same date, noting ‘the battle has been won and the enemy is breaking up’.[84] Rommel had pulled the ‘rabbit out of the hat’ yet again.[85]These miscalculations in British reporting reinforced the illusion of Rommel as a near-invincible commander, seemingly capable of turning the tide against overwhelming odds. As successive reports failed to acknowledge the precariousness of British positions, the public narrative of Rommel as a military mastermind became further entrenched.

By the end of June, Rommel had been referenced over 70 times within The Times. Both Rommel himself and the British press note his triumph against the odds, and thus his newfound publicity was the blame of British leadership. Rommel notes that the victory came as a ‘complete surprise to world opinion’ and the command of his adversary, Lieutenant General Ritchie, became the subject of severe criticism.[86]The Manchester Guardian’s headline for June 22 captures the essence of this explanation, ‘Our Defeat in Libya: Errors in the Field, Inferior Arms’, essentially pinning the blame on weak leadership and ineffective equipment.[87] This line was reiterated in British papers repeatedly after the fall of Tobruk. The Times released an article titled ‘Lessons of Libyan Campaign’, further attributing the ‘inferiority in hitting power’ and ‘blunder in generalship’ to the events at Tobruk.[88] As far as weaponry is concerned, the British press claimed that the German tanks and anti-tank weapons ‘outranged and outgunned everything on our side’.[89]The Times highlighted the impact of the ‘Converted A.A Gun’, an 88mm in a vehicle with hardened armour, which was cited as decisive within most British articles. The British commentators saw Rommel as a beneficiary of superior equipment rather than a genius of warfare.

British commentators also focussed on the failure of the British generals ‘to adapt to the modern mechanized battlefield’, as phrased by Campo.[90]The Times criticised the current state of the British military, believing it was hindered by a ‘lack of imagination and capacity to innovate’ and noting the lure of ‘precedent, convention, and past experience is the gravest of handicaps’.[91]It also called for ‘the urgent need for bringing fresh blood and fresh ideas into the conduct of war’, men who were ‘tank-minded and air-minded’.[92] Alan Moorehead also analysed what Britain was lacking in ‘Quick-decision men’.[93] Rommel concludes along the same lines as the British media that ascribed ‘shortcomings of the British command during the African campaign to the British generals’ close associations with infantry warfare’ grounded in the static positional warfare of the 1914-1918 campaign.[94] Rommel describes himself as the ‘modern army commander’ who could free himself from routine methods and adapt his ideas of warfare to the possibilities of the moment. In contrast, Rommel believed that ‘old school’ General Ritchie was unable to adapt to tank warfare and the ‘nature of the desert battlefield’.[95] Speaking to Commonwealth officers captured at Tobruk, Rommel offered up that they had ‘been led by donkeys’.[96] Rommel’s military masterpiece had been pulled off thanks to his daring approach, whilst the cautious General Ritchie was sacked. It was clear that the British commentators acknowledged that Rommel was a standard of comparison to the British generals but there is no evidence to suggest this was decided as a strategy to deflect the failures of the British army. The Allied commentators had indicated that the British Eighth Army was in a stronger position and a force that was capable of winning. Suddenly, Tobruk was lost, and Churchill had to reconcile with what he noted in his memoirs; ‘Defeat is one thing, disgrace is another’.[97] As Campo summarizes, the Allied newspapers presented Rommel and the Afrikakorps as bold, smart, and adaptable, whilst the British were perceived as passive, stuck in tradition and clumsy with their tanks.[98] Thus, whilst the British media wrote kindly towards Rommel’s military ability, they did not, nor did they need to create the legend of the ‘Desert Fox’ to explain their defeat. Rather, unrealistic expectations of victory and British military weaknesses made the sudden fall of Tobruk appear as a ‘tour de force’.[99]

Ralf Georg Reuth argued that the British victory in the Battle of El Alamein, on November 4, 1942, gave the British media a propaganda moment that placed General Bernard Montgomery in the limelight above this undefeatable General Rommel, rather than using it to chip away at the military allure Rommel had gained after Tobruk.[100] El Alamein is highly regarded as the turning point for British fortunes in the North Africa campaign, as Churchill wrote in The Hinge of Fate: ‘Before Alamein we never had a victory. After Alamein, we never had a defeat’.[101] Rommel also commented that El Alamein was the ‘decisive battle of the African campaign’ and due to the loss of a large part of his infantry and motorised forces, Rommel was forced to withdraw over one thousand miles to Tunisia.[102] By May 1943, the Axis presence in Africa was all but eliminated. Newspapers accentuated these successes and assured the allied citizens that this was a decisive and ‘complete victory’.[103] On November 5, The Times headlined ‘Rommel’s Army in Full Retreat’ after capturing ‘over 9,000 prisoners’ and destroying ‘more than 260 German and Italian tanks’.[104] Days later, it describes how Rommel’s defeat has ‘become a rout’ as ‘the disintegration of the Axis army is proceeding rapidly’.[105] This evidence challenges Reuth’s argument by demonstrating that rather than elevating Montgomery by sustaining the Rommel myth, British propaganda actively linked Rommel to the defeat at El Alamein. This suggests a shift in how he was presented—not as an enduring enemy figure but as a symbol of a shattered German war effort.

In fact, the British media went one step further and attempted to break the growing myth surrounding Rommel. This was first seen in The Times report of mid-December which read: ‘The legend of Rommel, as an invincible genius of generalship, was decisively exploded in the battle of El Alamein, where he was outmanoeuvred’.[106]The Daily Mirror also ridiculed the mythlike stature of Rommel, writing ‘there were many people in this country so obsessed with the advertised magic of Rommel that they turned him into a myth… Thank goodness the scene has changed. There are new idols today and British idols… They have routed Rommel in a fair fight, and they have destroyed the legend of German invincibility’.[107] For the purposes of this study, the use of the term ‘myth’ and ‘legend’ presents a strong argument that the British press noticed an obsession for Rommel growing in the British public in 1942. In a reversal of Tobruk, the British newspapers also applauded the performance of new military leadership. The British press emphasized that ‘Rommel had been out-generaled’ by Montgomery who matched ‘strategic forethought’ with ‘tactical resource and daring after action was joined’ – attributes which were commonly attributed to Rommel.[108] Rommel also gave the indication that the ‘British command had made excellent use of the experience they had gained in previous actions with Axis forces’, made possible by the ’vast stocks of ammunition and new equipment’.[109] This is not to deny, however, that British numerical superiority was the decisive factor. It is quite possible that the narrative of de-elevating Rommel’s status may have been decided upon by the British military and given to the Ministry of Information to exploit. The narrative of ‘our friend Rommel’ became a psychological barrier for both citizens and soldiers, which went against the negative view the government wanted the media to create about the Germans. Destroying Rommel’s invincibility through a media campaign appeared a likely solution to this problem. This upsurge in prestige also resulted in representations of Rommel as a ‘Nazi thug and Hitler Favourite’.[110] To highlight the Hitler connection, the Daily Mirror printed an excerpt from Postmarked Berlin, which commented that ‘in every sense of the word Rommel is a Hitler general’.[111] The Manchester Guardian also described Rommel as ‘the typical S.A (Sturm Abteilung)’.[112] Gone was the imagery of Rommel as the traditional German soldier, replaced by those spotlighting his Nazi credentials. Thus, far from exploiting the Rommel myth to elevate the stature of Montgomery and the El Alamein victory as Reuth claimed, the British press sought to demystify and destroy Rommel’s reputation as the invincible genius.

Therefore, looking at the portrayal of Rommel within British newspapers suggest a need to re-evaluate the belief that the ‘Desert Fox’ was a media creation, used to deflect attention away from British weaknesses and the inability to defeat the Afrikakorps. While the British media acknowledged Rommel’s military ability, their coverage did not deliberately construct the ‘Desert Fox’ legend as an excuse for defeat. However, it remains debatable whether the repeated emphasis on his tactical brilliance—often at the expense of British command failures—unintentionally contributed to his myth’s longevity. Naïve expectations of victory resulted in the British public acquiring a collective memory of Rommel as an invincible general who was able to perform the impossible. In the end, the British press took it upon themselves to demystify Rommel as an unbeatable genius and stressed the narrative that Rommel was Hitler’s favourite general in response to the growing admiration from the British nation. Yet, the popular reception of Desmond Young’s Rommel: The Desert Fox, just five years after the war ended, offered that the appeal for Rommel had not been dissipated by the anti-propaganda campaign. Rather, the positive reputation of Rommel was built in British wartime propaganda and it was upon this foundation that the Rommel myth of the 1950s was in large part based.

Chapter Three: Tobruk

The field of study concerning Rommel has typically agreed that the Axis Capture of Tobruk, on June 21, 1942, was the zenith of his military career which led to an influx of positive propaganda produced by the British press and the Nazi Pro-Mi. Ralf Georg Reuth described how ‘Goebbel’s masterful product had reached the pinnacle of his glory’.[113] Daniel Allen Butler commented on this victory as a watershed moment that marked ‘the beginning of the legend of the Desert Fox’.[114] So whilst Reuth argues that Tobruk was the peak of Rommel’s propaganda victories for the Nazi regime, Butler argued that it was merely the beginning of a stream of attention given to Rommel within Allied media. Despite their differing interpretations—Reuth viewing Tobruk as the peak of Rommel’s propaganda value for the Nazis, and Butler considering it the beginning of his legend in Allied media—both historians underscore the battle’s pivotal role in shaping the Rommel myth across both German and British narratives. Thus, it appears of vital importance for a study on Rommel and propaganda to analyse the media narratives from the battle and the aftermath of the Axis Capture of Tobruk. By comparing newspaper reports from Britain and Germany, we can get an insight into how collective memory was shaped and how it differed over state borders on the same historical event. Resultingly, a case study on Tobruk can provide a more nuanced analysis of the different propaganda strategies employed and how far they aided the creation of the Rommel myth.

Tobruk, or more specifically its harbour, was a great strategic prize along the Cyrenaican coast, being the only port of significant size other than Benghazi between Tripoli and Alexandria.[115] Tobruk represented a great challenge for Rommel, who was no stranger to the fortress after it had presented immense difficulties in the earlier Siege of Tobruk in 1941. Lieut.-General Fritz Bayerlein commented on the strategic importance of taking Tobruk, to ‘acquire a supply port close to the front’, meaning Rommel would be able to operate with far greater ease and freedom.[116] It would also take Germany one step closer to taking Cairo and the Suez Canal, the latter essentially the crossroads for global shipping. Also, as Rommel commented, Tobruk was a ‘symbol of British resistance’ – capturing it would win Germany an immense propaganda victory.[117]The Times remarked that the Tobruk would be above all a ‘victory of prestige’, but also provide ‘clear lines of communication along the coastal road’.[118] It also reflected the importance of Tobruk for the British, stating that ‘it must be held, and it must be strengthened’ as the loss of Libya would multiply the dangers that lour over the theatre of war in the Mediterranean and the Middle East, such as the isolation of Malta.[119] Thus, it was equally imperative in the North African Campaign for Rommel to take Tobruk, as it was for the Allies to hold it.

New access to German newspapers is extremely exciting due to the missing information on Nazi propaganda, from June to December 1942. This is because large sections of the Goebbels Diaries are missing, either burnt by Goebbels or destroyed in ignorance. As a result, Goebbels’ take on the Axis Capture of Tobruk and its aftermath is lost. This means the availability of Nazi newspapers to the public becomes vital in understanding how Rommel was presented by the Pro-Mi at Tobruk. The Völkische Beobacter alone contained four headlines that centred around ‘Rommel’ between June 18– 28 1942 which reveals vital information surrounding the nature of the Pro-Mi marketing of Rommel.

The initial line from the German press emphasised emphasized Tobruk as Rommels überraschende Sieg, which gave praise to his ‘irresistible offensive drive’ and ‘brilliant tactical skill’.[120] To quote the Völkischer Beobachter, in another unexpected victory, Rommel had broken off ‘the last and most important corner post of the British defence system’.[121] When asked how the rapid fall of Tobruk was made possible, Rommel replied that it was due to the tactics of Blitzkreig and Kesselschlact. In relation to the rapid military successes in Bir Hacheim, Gazala and Tobruk, Rommel authored ‘If you give an Englishman a punch in the stomach one day, one in the belly the next and on the third, one in the behinds, then he can’t take it’.[122] A report from Kock further emphasised the effectiveness of Blitzsieg.[123] Both the Rommel Papers and Koch’s report cite the battle beginning at 5.20 on June 19, with Rommel authoring ‘several hundred aircraft hammering their bombs on the break-in point.[124] Similarly, Koch describes a bombardment from Stukas, followed by a barrage of artillery.[125] Whilst Rommel is far more detailed in his description, both also note that the Afrikakorps used a centre of penetration to break into the fortified area. The consistency between the Pro-Mi’s portrayal of Tobruk and Rommel’s account in The Rommel Papers—widely regarded as an accurate depiction of his tactics—suggests that Nazi propaganda did not need to exaggerate his military actions. Instead, Rommel’s achievements were presented in factual terms, reinforcing his image as a formidable strategist without overt mythologization. Peter Longerich’s argument applies here that suggested Goebbels worked hard during the war to maintain an appropriate level of morale among the public surrounding the military situation, neither too optimistic nor too grim.[126] Goebbels believed that the victory at Tobruk needed to be calmly and factually reported in the press, to rein in the widespread over-confidence, and mythos that Rommel had earnt. Reuth also wrote that the propaganda minister directed press and radio broadcasters that the fall of Tobruk ‘should not be allowed to create the impression in the German public that England was already on its knees’.[127] This gives the impression that Rommel and his military ability and tactics have not been as overexaggerated in Nazi propaganda as typically believed. One must therefore make the distinction between Rommel as a propaganda tool and Rommel as a propaganda creation. In this instance, Rommel was used as a tool to draw public attention to a great victory, but his military tactics were described very accurately.

Tobruk was also a huge victory for German prestige. Multiple newspapers on this date use a quote from Rommel in response to the claim that victory was inevitable as German leadership was better than the enemies. Rather, Rommel argues that victory was made possible nur mit deutschen Soldaten.[128] This quote was likely chosen to reinforce a narrative of individual sacrifice and collective strength, fostering a sense of camaraderie among the German people. By emphasizing the indispensable role of German soldiers rather than attributing victory solely to superior leadership, the Pro-Mi sought to boost morale and deepen nationalistic fervor. Presenting the heroism and achievements of the individual German soldier would not only incite more men to join but would also invoke a sense of nationalism and unity. This fits in with the narrative from Hitler, who wrote that Rommel was seen in the mind of the German population as ‘the personification of the successful German solider’.[129] Furthermore, Der Freiheitskampf gave Tobruk the title Afrikas Verdun.[130] Not only would this emphasize the individual sacrifice of the soldiers who fought, but this powerful historical analogy would also highlight the strategic importance of this victory to the public. This was because Verdun was a vital turning point for the French in the First World War, so to attribute this turning point victory to the Germans would be a huge morale victory. In a similar vein, the image used on the front page might have been chosen to promote nationalism. It depicts Rommel wearing his military uniform and speaking to Italian generals on the Tobruk frontline (see Figure 3).[131]

Figure 3 - Rommel speaking to Italian Generals

This image would serve as an appeal to nationalist sentiment within Germany. Accompanied by the main article on Tobruk, this image emphasizes the role of Rommel, alongside the Africa Korps as being primarily attributable to military successes in North Africa, whilst downplaying the contributions of the other Axis powers. This is because the Italian contribution appears to be side-lined both within this image and the main text. This promotion of German superiority and dominance over the other Axis powers thus created a greater sense of nationalist pride amongst the German people. Whilst it presents Rommel as a key figure, this appears to be overshadowed by messages of military power and patriotism, which are clearly represented in the heavily decorated military uniform that Rommel is wearing, furthering the idea that Rommel was used as a tool for propaganda messages. Conclusively, German newspapers after the Axis Capture of Tobruk show that by mid-1942, Rommel by name and image, had become a symbol of German superiority and military success.

The Pro-Mi were also quick to switch the main headlines coming out of Tobruk from Rommel’s success to discrediting the British government. By 1942, Britain and Churchill became the principal target of German domestic propaganda, even after strategic interests had shifted decisively elsewhere. When Goebbels claimed, ‘We hate the British from the depth of our soul’, Soviet Russia was Germany’s main opponent on the battlefield.[132] In the case of Rommel, strategic interest in North Africa shifted to a campaign against British competency and leadership. The Völkischer Beobachter spoke of a Weg der Illusionen that the British government commonly used to cover up bad defeats.[133] It emphasises how the British went ‘searching for scapegoats’, which they found in the ‘usual manner’ of ‘defective equipment’, despite the British leadership ‘leaving much to be desired’.[134] Another report also mentions Tobruk cost Britain ‘extraordinary sacrifices’ that it claims Churchill had tried to conceal.[135] An insightful report is written in the Völkische Beobacter by war correspondent Lutz Koch. Koch reveals that the British believed in the impregnability of Tobruk so far as some British officers believed it was einem Witz that the siege was even attempted.[136] On the day that Rommel had been made Field Marshall and later described as the day of his greatest-ever victory, the key headline focused on mocking the British attitude and failure. There is also a distinct lack of imagery, nor a mention of Rommel’s mythlike status. The theme of discrediting the British government continued to take precedence over the marketing of Rommel – Empörung über Tobruk mit faulen Mitteln unterdrückt headlined the newspaper on June 25, implying that the British government and military attempted to hide their shortcoming from the British public.[137] Whilst not necessarily true, such a headline, portraying the British government as weak and corrupt, would continue to portray the Nazi regime as morally and militarily superior. The climax of this attack on British leadership appears in the edition of the June 28, titled Generale in Nordafrika sollen Churchills Supper auslöffeln.[138] This headline suggests that the British military in North Africa is experiencing significant issues and may be on the verge of total collapse. The use of the metaphor ‘soup spilling out’ furthers that the British situation is chaotic, out of control and becoming a sort of Komödie.[139] As these newspapers would likely have been suppressed by the British government, it appears most likely to suggest the importance of these reports was to reiterate German superiority to the German populace. If Britain was seen as on the verge of collapse, it would also show victory was possible and that the sacrifices they were making were worth it, despite the situation in the Soviet Union increasingly turning against them.

From a British standpoint, the fall of Tobruk was the ‘crowning disappointment’ of the Libyan campaign.[140] British papers focus heavily on the (incorrect) belief that the Axis powers possessed qualitative superiority at Tobruk. Addressing the recent events at Tobruk, Clement Attlee’s accounted that the bulk of the Commonwealth tank force was made up of ‘Matildas, Crusader, Valentines and Honies, all armed with the little two-pounder, which has again and again proved almost completely useless against the German tanks’.[141]The Times added that although the new 6-pounder anti-tank gun was an excellent weapon, it had only arrived in North Africa a ‘short time before the campaign opened’ and in ‘inadequate qualities’.[142] Attlee adds that ‘a commander so outranged and outgunned’ by the very inferiority of his equipment ‘sealed the fate of Tobruk’.[143]The Times reiterated this perspective by headlining the ‘sheer weight of metal’ which gave Rommel tactical superiority at Tobruk. This angle presents that the British perceived that Rommel had profited off a greater supply and production line, which was the decisive factor in the Fall of Tobruk. It has since been proven that the Commonwealth forces had superior numbers.[144] Arguably excusing the defeat to correctible deficiencies was likely used to downplay the characteristic of invincibility that Rommel had gained in his most distinguished battle.

Furthermore, the British press produced a mass of reports following the fall of Tobruk which called for the government to explain the unexpected defeat, as British forces appeared to be in a winning position. In a similar vein to German newspapers, British newspapers recognised the significant role and military skill of Rommel at Tobruk yet did also not appear to glorify him or portray him as a heroic figure. In initial reports, The Times focussed on the tactical ability of Rommel, noting his ‘exceedingly dashing and skilfully executed manoeuvre’ at the start of the battle.[145] There are also flattering comments on the speed of Rommel’s attacks, commenting that he ‘is not the man to waste time when there seems to be a chance of getting home a blow before our forces have been able to reorganize fully’.[146] Rommel’s frequent presence in British newspapers reinforced his dominance in the public narrative, ensuring that his role in the Axis victory at Tobruk was unmistakable. In stark contrast, General Ritchie was given little to no attention as he was later sacked on June 25. Crucially, despite Rommel’s prominence in British coverage of Tobruk, the moniker ‘Desert Fox’ does not appear in The Times throughout the wartime period. This challenges Butler’s assertion that the legend originated from British media, suggesting instead that Rommel’s reputation grew from the portrayal of his tactical brilliance rather than deliberate myth-making. Thus, whilst there is clear regard to the skill of Rommel, Butler’s notion of Tobruk being ‘the beginning of the legend of the Desert Fox’ and the popular belief this was earned through the British press is not supported by the lack of use of the term in British newspapers. Rather, the use of adjectives and idealizations associated with the Rommel mythology, along with the contrasting figure of Ritchie, made the figure of Rommel appear to have pulled off a tactical triumph, resulting in greater admiration from the British public.

Conclusively, this study on the Axis Capture of Tobruk can aid in how far the Rommel myth can be situated within wartime propaganda. Although Rommel’s military victories had reached their pinnacle, there is little evidence to suggest that he was marketed as a ‘national hero’ in the initial aftermath. The Pro-Mi did not need to further mythologise Rommel’s military actions as his name had already become situated in legend. Instead, Rommel’s great victory was exploited as a propaganda tool to reiterate military idealizations of sacrifice and national superiority, with a clear focus on presenting the British government as weak and on the verge of collapse. Similarly, the British press had no reason to nor is there any evidence of marketing Rommel as a legendary figure. In truth, depicting Rommel as a bold and skilful commander was enough to infatuate the myth amongst the British public, as early optimism and static British leadership lent credence to the notion that Rommel had pulled off a military masterpiece. Ultimately, despite starkly different propaganda strategies, Rommel’s triumph at Tobruk solidified his legacy in wartime collective memory. In Germany, he became a symbol of military prowess and national pride, while in Britain, his tactical brilliance—rather than explicit myth-making—fueled public fascination and admiration.

Conclusion

To conclude, this dissertation has highlighted how perceptions of Erwin Rommel in wartime propaganda were more complicated and varied than had previously been suggested. The traditional view that the Rommel myth was founded in a collection of favourable post-war hagiographies should be re-examined. While the notion of the ‘Desert Fox’ is more prominent in post-war popular mass media on Rommel, his myth was built upon perceptions and portrayals from wartime propaganda, specifically in 1942. The appeal towards Rommel in Germany arose from the military idealizations which represented Rommel as a national hero, founded upon his relationship with the common soldier, his bravery, and his ultimate coerced sacrifice. These themes remained consistent throughout the war, with Goebbels carefully controlling Rommel's portrayal to avoid fuelling overconfidence in German victory New findings from Nazi newspapers in the aftermath of the Axis Capture of Tobruk emphasize that the Pro-Mi had no significant reason to boost the legendary status of Rommel further as his name alone had become akin to military idealizations of sacrifice and German superiority at this point. Whilst seen as a formidable opponent in his earlier exploits, Rommel reached the apex of his mythology in wartime British media at the battles of Gazala and Tobruk. Although newspapers wrote favourably about Rommel’s military ability, they did not, nor did they need to, create the legend of the ‘Desert Fox’ to explain their defeat. Rather, naïve expectations of victory and military idealizations resulted in the British public acquiring a collective memory of Rommel as an invincible general, who was able to perform the impossible. This form of admiration was great enough for the British press to note a myth over Rommel having formed. It was only after the stunning defeat at Tobruk did British mass media focus on demystifying Rommel and emphasized his role as Hitler’s favourite general.

The intention of this study was to understand how wartime impressions of Rommel facilitated the favourable perspective that arose in the 1950s. The neglection of the role of wartime collective memory in the creation of the Rommel myth denies an insight into the cultural and political climate in which the myth was forged. Understanding this context is crucial in understanding why this myth persists to this day and continues to impact the way Rommel is remembered in Germany and beyond. Through the study of wartime propaganda, we can grasp a greater understanding of this complex phenomenon. For the Nazi Pro-Mi, it can be argued that Rommel was a figure who embodied the best of German military tradition and became a symbol of national pride. Distanced from atrocities elsewhere, Rommel’s positive wartime image in Germany led to his post-war marketing as the hero of the ‘Clean Wehrmacht’.[147] In Britain, wartime press coverage of Rommel emphasized his invincibility, with each victory—particularly at Gazala and Tobruk—reinforcing his mythos as an unbeatable general. It can be argued upon this foundation that the Rommel myth of the 1950s was in large part based. This study also raises further questions surrounding collective memory and the Rommel myth. If the Rommel myth was largely a creation of wartime propaganda, as this study has shown, how much of it has survived in post-war collective memory and to what extent has it been perpetuated by subsequent generations? This is a complex question that would require further research and analysis.

This study doesn’t aim to suggest that traditional narratives of the ‘Desert Fox’ being situated in post-war bibliographies are redundant but suggests how these overshadow the creation of the Rommel myth within wartime propaganda. By dismissing this form of portrayal, it misses the best opportunity to capture the essence of what it was about Rommel that made him an excellent and iconic military commander, who became respected and admired across the world, despite the war being characterized by hate. Newspapers from Germany and Britain in the Second World War played a key role in marketing Rommel to the respective populations, resulting in similar state-wide collective memories of a mythos; A man who became situated in legend.

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[1]Desmond Young, Rommel: The Desert Fox, (Harper and Row, 1950), 1-291 [2] From mid-1970, the term ‘Rommel myth’ appears in most bibliographies on Rommel including Ralf Georg Reuth, Rommel: The End of a Legend, (London: Haus Books, 2005), 222; Steven Pressfield, Killing Rommel, (London: Bantam, 2009), 142, Peter Caddick-Adams, Monty and Rommel: Parallel Lives, (London: Arrow Books, 2012), 484 [3]Claude Auchinleck in Young, Rommel: The Desert Fox, 10 [4]Basil Liddell Hart, ‘Introduction’ in Erwin Rommel, The Rommel Papers, (1953), 24 [5]Hans Speidel, Invasion 1944: Rommel and the Normandy Campaign, (Henry Regnery Company; 1950), 164 [6]Wolf Heckmann, Rommel’s War in Africa, (New York: Smithmark, 1995), 108 [7]David Irving, Rommel, The Trail of the Fox, (EN, 1977), 14 [8]Richard J. Evans, Lying About Hitler: History, Holocaust, and the David Irving Trial (New York: Basic Books, 2001) [9]Reuth, Rommel: The End of a Legend, 161 [10] Caddick-Adams, Monty and Rommel: Parallel Lives, 471 [11] Irving, Rommel, The Trail of the Fox, 7 [12]Reuth, Rommel: The End of a Legend, 141 [13] ‘House of Commons’, The Times, January 28, 1942, 8 [14]Douglas Porch, The Path to Victory: The Mediterranean Theater in World War II, (New York: Farrar, Straus, and Giroux, 2004), 208 [15] Joseph Allen Campo, Desert Fox or Hitler Favorite? Myths and Memories of Erwin Rommel: 1941-1970, (University of California, 2019), 16 [16]Campo, Desert Fox or Hitler Favorite? 25 [17]Maurice Halbwachs, The Collective Memory, (New York: Harper and Row, 1980), 1-196 [18]John Toland, Adolf Hitler, (Garden City, N.Y: Doubleday, 1976), 743 [19] ‘Rommel’s New Retreat’, The Times, December 15th, 1942, 5 [20]Ian Baxter, Images of War: Afrika Korps, (Pen and Sword Military, 2014) [21] Joseph Goebbels, Die Tagebücher des Joseph Goebbels, 1924-45, Vol 2, Munich, (2000), 385 [22]Reuth, Rommel: The End of a Legend, 121 [23]Robert Michael Citino, Death of the Wehrmacht: The German Campaigns of 1942, (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 2007), 118 [24]Adolf Hitler, Mein Kampf, Translated by Ralph Manheim, digitallibraryindia; JaiGyan, (1943), 198 [25] Ibid [26] Ralf Georg Reuth, Goebbels, (New York: Harcourt Brace, 1993), 173 [27]Reuth, Goebbels, 172 [28]Benoît Lemay, ‘Erwin Rommel : Le Héros De La Propagande.’, Guerres Mondiales et Conflits Contemporains, no. 234 (2009), 32 [29] Ibid [30] Citino, Death of the Wehrmacht: The German Campaigns of 1942, 287 [31] Hitler, Mein Kampf, 312 [32]Reuth, Rommel: The End of a Legend, 121 [33]‘Das ist “Unser Rommel”, Illustriertes Tageblatt, November 22, 1940, 4 [34]Albert Speer, Erinnerungen, Francfort-sur-le-Main, (Ullstein, 1969), 2 [35] David Fraser, Knights Cross: A Life of Field Marshal Erwin Rommel, New York, (NY: HarperCollins 1993), 421 [36] United States Holocaust Memorial Museum, ‘Writing the News’, Holocaust Encyclopedia, Writing the News | Holocaust Encyclopedia (ushmm.org), accessed 25/03/2023, 1 [37]Erwin Rommel, The Rommel Papers, (1953), 122 [38] Reuth, Rommel: The End of a Legend, 126 [39]‘Der Triumph der “Schnellen Truppen”,Reisaer Tageblatt, June 12, 1940, 7 [40] ‘On the Rommelbahn at half three in the night, Ghosts race by in full might, Rommel himself is in front, Keeping up is everyone’s wont, On the Rommelbahn at half three in the night’; ‘Auf der Rommelbahn nachts um halb drei’, Bundesarchiv-Militärachiv Freiburg, N, 117/17 [41]Reuth, Rommel: The End of a Legend, 126 [42] ‘Das ist “Unser Rommel”, Illustriertes Tageblatt, November 22, 1940, 4 [43] Joseph Goebbels, The Goebbels Diaries, 1939-41, Edited and Translated by Fred Taylor, (New York: Putnam, 1983), 296 [44] Rommel, The Rommel Papers, 158 [45] ‘Das Alte Lied’, Völkischer Beobachter, June 9, 1941, 1 [46]Joseph Goebbels, The Goebbels Diaries, Edited and translated by Louis P. Lochner, (New York: Doubleday, 1948), 399 [47]‘Die Rückoberung Bengasis durch Rommel’, Neue Mannheimer Zeitung, January 20, 1942, 1 [48]‘1933-1942: Neun Jahre Arbeit, Erfolg und Sieg!’, Neue Mannheimer Zeitung, January 20, 1942, 1 [49]‘Rommel-Sieg’, Völkischer Beobachter, June 18, 1942, 1 [50]Goebbels, The Goebbels Diaries, 278 [51]‘Rommel “Africanus”, Straßburger neueste Nachrichten, June 23, 1942, 1 [52]Reuth, Rommel: The End of a Legend, 136 [53]‘Ein Jahr Kreig gegen Moskau’, Völkischer Beobachter, June 21, 1942, 1 [54]Ibid [55]Goebbels, The Goebbels Diaries, 245 [56] Rommel “Africanus”, Straßburger neueste Nachrichten, June 23, 1942, 1 [57]‘Die Lehre von Tobruk’, Hakenkreuzbanner, June 23, 1942, 1 [58]David Welch, “Nazi Propaganda and the Volksgemeinschaft: Constructing a People’s Community.” Journal of Contemporary History 39, no. 2 (2004), 237 [59]‘Rommel beim Hitler’, Frankenburger Tageblatt, March 21,1942, 6 [60]Goebbels, The Goebbels Diaries, 266 [61] Citino, Death of the Wehrmacht: The German Campaigns of 1942,), 118 [62]Adolf Hitler, ‘Der Tagesbefehl des Fuhrers’, Völkischer Beobachter, October 10, 1944, 1 [63] Ibid [64] ‘Abscheid von unserem Rommel’, Völkischer Beobachter, October 10, 1944, 1 [65]Max Hastings, Armageddon: The Battle for Germany, 1944-45, (London: Pan, 2005), 178 [66] ‘Rommels Geist lebt in deutschen Soldaten fort’, Straßburger neueste Nachrichten, October 20, 1944, 1 [67] Goebbels, Die Tagebücher des Joseph Goebbels, 1924-45, 385 [68] Ben Shepherd, ‘The Clean Wehrmacht, the War of Extermination, and Beyond’, The Historical Journal 52, no. 2 (2009), 456 [69] Quoted in Reuth, Rommel: The End of a Legend, 141 [70] Campo, Desert Fox or Hitler Favorite? 165 [71]The National Archives, CAB 16/127 MIC 7 "Report of the MOI Planning Subcommittee", 27th July 1936 [72]Elizabeth Tate Goins, Promoting Unity Through Propaganda: How the British Government Utilized Posters During the Second World War, (Western Kentucky University, 2011), 33 [73]Phillip M Taylor, British Propaganda in the 20th Century: Selling Democracy, (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 1999), 172 [74] Arthur Marwick, “Print, Pictures, and Sound: The Second World War and the British Experience’, Daedalus 111, no. 4, (1982), 141 [75] ‘Rommel Hits Back’, The Times, January 24, 1942, 3; ‘Rommels Advance’, The Times, January 27, 1942, 2 [76] Quoted in Reuth, Rommel: The End of a Legend, 140 [77] Rommel, The Rommel Papers, 245 [78] Rommel, The Rommel Papers, 256 [79]‘Rommel Mauled, Turning Back’, Daily Mirror, June 1, 1942, 1; ‘Rommel’s Tanks Tackled’, The Times, June 8, 1942, 3 [80] ‘Rommels Tanks Tackled’, The Times, June 8, 1942, 3; ‘Rommel Widens the Gap’, The Times, June 4, 1942, 4. [81]‘Libyan “Battle of the Cauldron” ‘, The Times, June 9, 1942, 4 [82]‘Our Position in Libya Satisfactory’, The Manchester Guardian, June 9, 1942, 1 [83]‘Our Tanks Hold Rommel’s Bid to Take Tobruk’, Daily Mirror, June 15, 1942, 1 [84] Rommel, The Rommel Papers, 266 [85]Reuth, Rommel: The End of a Legend, 145 [86] Rommel, The Rommel Papers, 245 [87]‘Our Defeat in Libya; Errors in the Field; Inferior Arms’, The Manchester Guardian, June 22, 1942, 1 [88] ‘Lessons of Libyan Campaign’, The Times, June 23, 1942, 4 [89] Ibid [90] Campo, Desert Fox or Hitler Favorite? 71 [91]‘The Road to Victory’, The Times, June 27, 1942, 4 [92]Ibid [93]Alan Moorehead, “Libyan Analysis,” Daily Express, June 23, 1942, 2 [94] Rommel, The Rommel Papers, 245 [95] Ibid, 246 [96]Daniel Allen Butler, Field Marshal: The Life and Death of Erwin Rommel, (Philadelphia; Oxford: Casemate, 2015), 222 [97]Winston Churchill, The Hinge of Fate, Vol 4, (digitallibraryindia; JaiGyan, 1950), 366 [98] Campo, Desert Fox or Hitler Favorite? 100 [99] Campo, Desert Fox or Hitler Favorite? 68 [100]Reuth, Rommel: The End of a Legend,154 [101] Churchill, The Hinge of Fate, 603 [102] Rommel, The Rommel Papers, 373 [103] ‘A ‘Complete Victory’, The Times, November 7, 1942, 4 [104]‘Rommel’s Army in Full Retreat’, The Times, November 5, 1942, 4 [105]‘Panzer Retreat Turning to Rout’, The Times, November 9, 1942, 4 [106] ‘Rommel’s New Retreat’, The Times, December 15, 1942, 5 [107] Quoted in Campo, Desert Fox or Hitler Favorite? 131 [108]“Victory in Egypt,” The Times, November 6, 1942, 3 [109] Rommel, The Rommel Papers, 376 [110] Campo, Desert Fox or Hitler Favorite? 107 [111] “How Rommel Trained His Men for the Desert,” Daily Mirror, July 2, 1942, 4 [112] Quoted from Campo, Desert Fox or Hitler Favorite? 110; Sturm Abteilung (SA), byname Stormtroopers or Brownshirts were a uniformed and armed fighting, protection and propaganda force of the Nazi Party [113]Reuth, Rommel: The End of a Legend, 148 [114] Butler, Field Marshal: The Life and Death of Erwin Rommel, 274 [115] Butler, Field Marshal: The Life and Death of Erwin Rommel, 222 [116] Quoted in Rommel, The Rommel Papers, 196 [117] Rommel, The Rommel Papers, 267 [118]‘Victory of Prestige’, The Times, June 22, 1942, 4 [119] ‘Rommels überraschende Sieg über Tobruk’, Völkischer Beobachter, June 22, 1942, 1 [120] ‘Rommels überraschende Sieg über Tobruk’, ’Völkischer Beobachter, June 22,1942, 1 [121]‘Englands letzter und wichstigster Eckpfieler’, Völkischer Beobachter, June 22, 1942, 2 [122]‘Rommel stürmt Tobruk? Ein Witz’, Völkischer Beobachter, June 23, 1942, 2 [123] Ibid [124] Rommel, The Rommel Papers, 274 [125] ‘Rommel stürmt Tobruk? Ein Witz’, Völkischer Beobachter, June 23, 1942, 1 [126]Peter Longerich, Goebbels: A Bibliography, (New York: Random House, 2015), 502-504 [127] Quoted in Reuth, Rommel: The End of a Legend, 149 [128] ‘Generale in Nordafrika sollen Churchills Supper auslöffeln’, Völkischer Beobachter, June 28, 1942, 1 [129] Quoted in Reuth, Rommel: The End of a Legend, 148 [130]‘Afrikas Verdun’, Der Freheitskampf, June 23, 1942, 1 [131]‘Rommel stürmt Tobruk? Ein Witz’, Völkischer Beobachter, June 23, 1942, 1 [132] Gerwin Strobl, The Germanic Isle: German perceptions of Britain before 1933, (Cambridge University Press, 2000), 7 [133]‘Sündenböcke gesucht’, Völkischer Beobachter, June 25, 1942, 2 [134] Ibid [135] ‘Englands letzter und wichstigster Eckpfieler’, Völkischer Beobachter, June 22, 1942, 2 [136] ‘Rommel stürmt Tobruk? Ein Witz’, Völkischer Beobachter, June 23, 1942, 1 [137]‘Empörung über Tobruk mit faulen Mitteln unterdrückt’, Völkischer Beobachter, June 25,1942, 1 [138] ‘Generale in Nordafrika sollen Churchills Supper auslöffeln’, Völkischer Beobachter, June 28, 1942, 1 [139] Ibid [140]‘Rommel’s Manoeuvre’, The Times, June 22,1942, 4 [141]‘Interim Message’, The Times, June 24, 1942, 4 [142] ‘Lessons of Libyan Campaign’, The Times, June 23, 1942, 4 [143] ‘Interim Message’, The Times, June 24, 1942, 4 [144] Campo, Desert Fox or Hitler Favorite? 68; Estimates 110,000 men to the Axis 90,000 [145] ‘Rommel’s Manoeuvre’, The Times, June 22,1942, 4 [146] ‘Rommel’s Next Manoeuvre’, The Times, June 25,1942, 4 [147] Shepherd, ‘The Clean Wehrmacht, the War of Extermination, and Beyond’, 456