Mussolini and Communism

Painting of Benito Mussolini by Gerardo Dottori, 1933

The question of whether Mussolini prevented Italy from becoming communist state requires an exploration of his rise to power and the role of anti-communism in his fascist regime. Mussolini’s political ascent was marked by a fierce opposition to the Italian Socialist Party (PSI) and other leftist movements, which he and his fascist "Blackshirts" actively suppressed through violence, intimidation, and propaganda. Anti-communism was not only a key ideological pillar of Italian fascism but also a tool Mussolini used to secure support from industrialists, landowners, and segments of the population fearful of socialist upheaval. However, his tactics were not solely ideological; they were deeply pragmatic. Early in his rule, Mussolini pursued cordial relations with the Soviet Union, prioritizing Italy’s geopolitical interests over a strict anti-communist agenda. Yet, as alliances shifted and Italy drew closer to Nazi Germany, his anti-communist stance became more rigid, expanding both domestically and internationally. This essay examines the extent to which Mussolini’s anti-communism, driven by both ideology and opportunism, prevented Italy from embracing communism, considering whether leftist movements would have posed a real threat without his authoritarian suppression and consolidation of power.

Even before Mussolini became the prime minister, his fascist party was actively fighting against the socialist party in Italy. Although it is possible that at this time, the anti-socialist stance was more of a political rivalry than a fight against a threat or enemy, violence was still used. The fascist “Blackshirts”, as they were known, used violence to both combat the popularity of the Socialist Party, and to gain more members and supporters for their party. Stephen J Lee explains that between 1920 and 1921, the Blackshirts used intimidation to force peasants and militant workers to support the Fascist Party over the Socialist Party, with methods as bizarre and cruel as “being forced to consume castor oil and live toads” in addition to beatings. Such violent treatment of the peasantry especially is mentioned by Leon Trotsky in his 1932 essay collection What Next? Vital Question for the German Proletariat: “Blackshirt “action squadrons” in vehicles supplied by big landowners, took over villages in lightning raids, beating and killing leftist peasants and labour leaders, wrecking radical headquarters, and terrorizing the populace”

These intimidation tactics would also have affected those who were not directly subjected to such torture, as they too would submit to the fascist regime out of fear for the consequences if they did not. Such tactics worked as by 1934, out of a population of 41.7 million, the Italian Socialist Party (PIR) had “barely 2,400 members, and it was by far the largest [opposition] organisation”. Lee also notes that it was this violence that allowed Mussolini’s party to “emerge as the main safeguard against industrial disruption”, following their success in completely shutting down an anti-fascist strike organised by the socialists in August 1922, just in a single day.  It was also the threat of force and violence that lead to Mussolini becoming prime minister in 1922. He demanded in Rome that his party should have at least 5 cabinet ministries and once in Naples began preparations for a march on Rome to seize power, should his conditions not be met. Initially, the King offered Mussolini the opportunity to form a coalition government, but this was declined. Consequently, on the 29th of October, the King requested Mussolini to form his government.

Once in power however, Mussolini opted for non-violent measures in order to further consolidate his leadership and remove opposition. Having experience in journalism, as editor both for the socialist paper Avanti, and the fascist Il Popolod’Italia, he knew the power that the press had in terms of propaganda. Therefore, one of the first actions he took in government was in July 1923, when he issued a decree, effectively subjecting all forms of press to his rule. Prefects were given the power to “warn any papers that incited 'to class hatred or disobedience of the laws and orders of the authorities.'”; if a paper received two warnings within a year it was shut down.  This controlling of the press ensured that only papers that either actively promoted fascism and Mussolini, or were at least sympathetic to the regime, were printed. It also ensured that the opposition was not given an outlet through which they could express their ideas and concerns to a wide section of the population. The spread of socialist ideas and movements, which was the largest opposition to the Fascist Party, were too curtailed in this manner.

Mussolini further removed political opposition in several different ways. This included claiming that the electoral mandates of some anti-fascist politicians that their electoral mandates were invalid and forcibly stopping the Secessionists from returning to their seats in parliament. Perhaps the most major method of removing political opposition, and therefore the threat of being voted out of parliament in favour of the Italian Socialist Party, came in 1928 through the creation of a new electoral law. This law permitted only members of the Fascist Grand Council to select all parliamentary candidates; candidates that were to be selected from a carefully curated list. As Stephen J. Lee says, “in effect, parliamentary elections had been replaced by a plebiscitary dictatorship”, that is to say, Italy had now become a one-party state.

Anti-communism (or anti-socialism) has often been cited as a key component of fascism across Europe; the historians Philip V. Cannisfraro and Edward D. Wyn went as far as to suggest that it was in fact “a fundamental raison d’être for all varieties of European fascism”. Mussolini himself stated that “Fascism [is] the complete opposite of… Marxian Socialism”. This was part of the definition of fascism written by Mussolini (with the help of Giovanni Gentile) for the Italian Encyclopaedia in 1932; anti-communism was written into the definition of Italian fascism and what constituted its ideology. The idea that anti-communism was ingrained in fascist ideology was also written into the Political and Social Doctrine of Fascism of the same year, which set out the basic principles of the movement. This idea was emphasised once again by Mussolini in 1936. However, this may have been more of an attempt to prevent Mussolini and Italian fascism being seen as simply copying Hitler and Nazism (German fascism) than it was purely to reiterate Mussolini’s commitment to anti-communism.

Interestingly, for a leader who considered anti-communism integral to his regime and its ideology, Mussolini pursued amicable relations, arguably even friendship, with the Soviet Union during the first years of his rule.  In September 1933, the two nations signed a “Pact of Friendship, Non-Aggression and Neutrality”. At this point, Mussolini viewed Hitler and Nazism as a greater threat to Italy than the Soviet Union and its communist regime. He admitted as such to Maxim Litvinov (a Soviet diplomat) on his visit to Italy, specifically “his antagonism to Germany and his consequent desire to strengthen relations with Russia”. This antagonism was further emphasised when Mussolini declared that “the ideology of Hitler has nothing whatsoever in common with the ideology of fascism”.  

Yet just a year later in 1934, the attitude of the Duce began to change. During the Ethiopian crisis, Germany was one of the few Western countries not to impose economic sanctions on Italy, sanctions that were imposed by the Soviet Union, despite the volume of Italo-Soviet trade that had developed as a result of the relationship between the two nations. As a result of the growing friendship between Italy and Germany, a nation whose regime and leader had been publicly and violently anti-communist since its conception, and Italy’s continued action in Ethiopia, the Soviet attitude towards Italy grew colder. Despite this, it has been argued that given that it was “only when Italian interests appeared to be endangered by Russian designs in the Balkan-Mediterranean area did Italian policy become anti-Soviet”, the diminishing relationship between the two nations was more the result of geopolitical differences instead of contrasting ideologies. However, it could just as easily be argued that it was ideological differences that caused Italian foreign policy to become anti-Soviet; if the Soviet Union’s designs on the Balkan-Mediterranean area were to be successful, then the communist threat would be right on Italy’s doorstep, in the form of one of the largest and most powerful nations in Europe, if not the whole world.

In January 1936, the Soviet politician Vyacheslav Molotov in a speech to the Central Committee stated that Italy was as much a “fascist aggressor” as Germany and Japan were, as the country now turned their anti-communist plight into one that was concerned with international communism (or preventing the spread internationally), rather than just domestically, as had previously been the focus. This change of focus can be seen in the creation of two successive propaganda committees; CAUR (Comitati d’Azione per l’Universalità di Roma, Action Committees for the Universality of Rome) in June 1933 and NUPIE (Nucleus for Italian Propaganda Abroad) in 1936. Certainly, the latter of these two organisations was inspired by the Nazi Antikominternorganisation, which incidentally highly encouraged Italy to spread its anti-communist propaganda internationally. This similarity and evident influence that German propaganda organisations had on Italy’s propaganda is one factor that lead to Mussolini and his regime being regarded as simply copying Hitler and the Nazi Party (something that Mussolini vehemently denied).

Whilst both of these organisations did promote fascist ideas (and therefore anti-communism) outside Italy, they also distributed the propaganda internally. NUPIE in particular utilised newer technologies such as motion pictures to further spread propaganda and worked in conjunction with the government on both national and international anti-communist programmes. Furthermore, in 1937 the Centre for Anti-Communist Studies was established, with its headquarters in Rome. The centre’s primary function was to collect information on Soviet Russia and communism more generally, thus providing the government with the information upon which they could base their anti-communist propaganda. Italy’s anti-communist propaganda, despite changing where it was primarily directed in the latter half of the 1930s, still would have spread anti-communism throughout the country. Just because Mussolini decided to expand the promotion of his ideals and the ideals of fascism across the borders, did not lead to a cessation of such propaganda inside the borders.

After analysing anti-communism during Mussolini’s rule, it appears evident that Mussolini prevented Italy from becoming Communist. Once he became Prime Minister, Mussolini utilised his power to remove political opposition both physically by making Italy a one-party state and in the media through his decree in 1923. Even before claiming leadership, he deployed fear tactics and violence to coerce the public, especially the peasantry, to support fascism. The violence from the Blackshirts was also effective in shutting down communist strikes and physical opposition. Despite initially positive relations with the Soviet Union during the first half of the 1930s, this did not change the feeling that anti-communism was an integral aspect of fascism. Once aligned with Nazi Germany, the anti-communist propaganda in Italy both increased and spread across the borders. Even when the Italo-German relations began to unravel, Mussolini was “stubbornly unwilling to abandon his recently acquired ideological militancy” and continued to distribute anti-communist propaganda in all its forms. Given that communism was the greatest opposition facing fascism in Italy, it is entirely conceivable that Italy may have become a communist country had Mussolini not taken charge when and in the manner that he did.

Bibliography

Primary Sources:

Benito Mussolini, “What is Fascism?”, in Modern History Sourcebook <https://sourcebooks.fordham.edu/mod/mussolini-fascism.asp> [accessed 17 March 2022]

Leon Trotsky, “How Mussolini Triumphed”, in What Next? Vital Question for the German Proletariat <https://www.marxists.org/archive/trotsky/works/1944/1944-fas.htm#p2> [accessed 17 March 2022]

Secondary Sources:

Baer, George W. Test Case: Italy, Ethiopia and the League of Nations, (Stanford, 1976)

Cannisfraro, Philip V, Wynot Jr, Edward D. “On the Dynamics of Anti-Communism as a Function of Fascist Foreign Policy, 1933-1943”. Il Politico, 38:4 (1973), pp.645-681

Gentile, Emilio. “Fascism and the Italian Road to Totalitarianism”, Constellations, 15:3 (2008-9), pp.291-302

Karis, Aristotle. “From CAUR to EUR: Italian Fascism, the “myth of Rome” and the pursuit of international primacy”, Patterns of Prejudice, 50:4-5 (2016), pp.359-377

Kertzer, David I. The Pope and Mussolini: The Secret History of Pius XI and the Rise of Fascism in Europe, (Oxford, 2014)

Lammers, Donald. “Fascism, Communism and the Foreign Office, 1937-39”, Journal of Contemporary History, 6:3 (1971), pp.66-86

Melograni, Piero.“The Cult of the Duce in Mussolini’s Italy”, Journal of Contemporary History, 11 (1976), pp.221-237

Population of Italy from 1770 to 2020 (in millions), Statista: https://www.statista.com/statistics/1015957/total-population-italy-1770-2020/ . Accessed: 20/3/22

Pugliese, Stanislao G. Fascism, anti-fascism and the resistance in Italy: 1919 to the present, (Lanham, 2004)

Stephen J. Lee.  European Dictatorships 1918-1945, (Oxon, 2016)