Chiang Kai-shek and Chinese appeasement with Japan, 1931-37

Wartime Portrait of Generalissimo Chiang Kai=shek, 1943

In the years 1931-1937, ‘Generalissimo’ Chiang Kai-Shek pursued a stance of appeasement with Japan, summarised through the policy of an nei jang wai (internal pacification before external resistance).[1] Influenced by the legacy of Dr Sun Yat-Sen and the Three Principles of the People, Chiang understood appeasement with Japan as being the most fruitful way of achieving the nationalist goals of Chinese independence and domestic unification. First, this essay will discuss how Chiang attempted to achieve these goals through an internationalist policy that called for aid from the League of Nations and the Great Powers. Chiang also prioritised internal development to achieve the unification of China, as seen in the personal goal of eradicating the Chinese Communist Party. It was only once all peaceful alternatives became impossible, and the communist insurrection quelled, that led Chiang to resist using aggression during the Sino-Japanese War of 1937.

In understanding the decision for appeasement with Japan, one must first consider the political heritage that Chiang undertook. According to Teh-Kuang Chang, Chiang’s foreign policy towards Japan came from a ‘world outlook that absorbed the teachings of Sun-Yat Sen’.[2] Chiang was a loyal disciple of Sun, so was more than willing to continue the development of China and lead the country towards intensive unification and complete independence. Chiang was guided in this endeavour by the Three Principles of the People, especially the Principles of Nationalism and Democracy, both challenged by Japanese expansionism. These principles are strongly reflected in Chiang’s Manifesto to the People, which argued the Kuomintang's purpose was to ‘promote the welfare of the Chinese people, to free the entire race and to strive for equality of all the nations of the world’.[3] To obtain this, it was the task of Chiang to overthrow ‘militarism and imperialism’ which both threatened Chinese unification and subsequent independence.[4]

Youli Sun describes how the initial response to Japanese expansionism from Chiang was based on a pre-conceived policy of ‘non-resistance’ as in the immediate aftermath of the Japanese Invasion of Manchuria in 1931, Chiang made no order for military action.[5] Chiang was firmly under the belief ‘conditions within the party and the country prevent the ability to defend themselves against foreign insults’.[6] This quote appears significant due to internal economic weaknesses within China in 1931 that made it necessary to avoid external conflict, as ‘China’s scientific inventions and industrial skill were in their infancy and inferior to Japan’s’.[7] Thus, it was vital for Chiang to resort to a diplomatic solution with Japan as it would be ‘ten, a hundred, a thousand times more effective than a military solution’ in the early 1930s.[8]

Due to internal weakness, Chiang proclaimed that his main goals for national unity and independence would only be possible by ‘instituting the international organization for the maintenance of world peace’.[9] Thus, cooperation between China and the League of Nations was seen as the most ‘important strategy’.[10] Chiang believed that if Japanese expansionism was checked by the League, it would solve the issue of external aggressiveness and imperial rule in China. The tendency to win the goodwill of the League was reflected In the Shanghai incident in 1932. Despite some early military success, Chiang ordered his generals to ‘end the war now’ as soon as the British and American consuls offered to mediate.[11] As a result, China’s initial strategy of appeasement with Japan was used to gain favourability with the League and wait for international justice to resist Japan.

Chiang’s international approach was also based on his perception of relations with the Great Powers inside the League of Nations. Chiang was under the assumption that if Japan wanted to occupy China, it would have to fight the Great Powers first, going so far as to characterize the Japanese attack on Manchuria as the ‘beginning of the second world war’.[12] In truth, however, the concerned powers had lost interest in China, especially in the first years of the Franklin D. Roosevelt administration which dealt with China in a permanent state of absentmindedness.[13] David M. Gordon adds that Britain also remained neutral throughout this period as they consistently underestimated Japanese strength, meaning their concern for China was limited.[14] It must also be noted that whilst the Soviet Union offered support, Chiang was unwilling to accept as collaboration would have threatened ‘China’s freedom’ which was seen as the ‘key to a lasting world peace’.[15] This minimal impact from the League of Nations led to the collapse of the internationalist policy in May 1933. As a result, China had to settle with Japan face-to-face, resorting to a policy of appeasement as Chiang felt China was unprepared to fight a war.[16]

Appeasement policies were also implemented due to Chiang’s willingness to continue the foreign policy that Sun took towards Japan. In response to a proposed policy by Ch’en You-Jen of cutting off diplomatic relations with Japan, Chiang warned the Chinese population with a quotation from Sun Yat-Sen: ‘If China breaks diplomatic relations, Japan can destroy all of China within ten days’[17]. Thus, Chiang imposed the continuation of the policy of limited resistance strategizing that ‘not until there is no hope of peace shall we abandon efforts to preserve peace, and not until sacrifice has reached its ultimate limit shall we scorn sacrifice’.[18]This was first seen two months before the Manchurian Incident as Chiang instructed his Northeast Army commander, Chang Hsueh-Liang to avoid conflict at all costs with Japan. In 1933, Chiang agreed to a military armistice in the North - The Tanggu Truce - that declared the Northern part of Hebei a demilitarised zone, effectively ceding a huge chunk of Chinese territory to Japanese de facto control.[19] There were further important concessions, such as the He-Umezu and Qin-Doihara Agreements (1935), as well as a scaling up of aggression seen in the Ishimoto, Chengtu and Pakhoi crises (1936), that culminated in the Marco-Polo Bridge Incident in July 1937.[20] This left China with no choice but to fight in the Second Sino-Japanese War of 1937 under the rhetoric for ‘national survival’ and for an ‘independent nation’. [21] Resultingly, the war continued to echo the personal goal of Chiang for a successful Nationalist revolution by placing Chinese unity and independence above all else. This is the reason Chiang first made the decision to pursue appeasement but with the build-up of Japanese expansionism, Chiang’s desire for this policy to continue appeared impossible in the climate of 1937.

As a strong nationalist, Chiang’s personal and explicit hatred of communists affected his decision to prioritise internal issues, as he commented ‘What we did not realise was that Communists are Communists, first, last and always.[22] He later reflected that whilst the Japanese ‘were a disease of the skin’, the ‘communists are a disease of the heart’.[23] Whilst Japan was capable of external damage, this quote shows clearly that Chiang saw the communists are a more insidious threat to China’s well-being and growth which resulted in the consistent policy of ‘first internal pacification, then external resistance’[24]. Jay Taylor even notes how Chiang was often willing to explore ways in which China and Japan could cooperate in fighting communism.[25] Thus, this shows how Chiang’s nationalist values, most significantly the Principle of Democracy, led to a desire to pursue a policy of appeasement with the Japanese in the period of 1931-37, as seen in his unwavering commitment to eliminating the Communist party completely first.

Due to his personal desire to eradicate the ‘Communist reign of terror’, Chiang adopted the policy of internal pacification.[26] This followed the legacy of Sun Yat-Sen, who believed ‘the Chinese republic should have a single party government’.[27] Resultingly, in his speech ‘Why Do We Want a Party?’, Chiang addressed that a single party was required to create a collective consciousness for national reconstruction, thus it became vital for Chiang to defeat the communists.[28] So Wai Chor explores how Chiang began to involve himself more in military campaigns against the communists, whilst giving Wang Jingwei’ more discretionary power on the day-to-day negotiations with Japan’.[29] This can be seen explicitly in the 1935 He-Umuzu Agreement, as for this incident Chiang was ‘in Chongqing conducting his extermination campaign against the communists’.[30] This absence from Japanese negotiations highlights Chiang’s interests a great deal as he believed it would be in China’s best interest to focus on defeating the Communist Party. Chiang’s involvement in the fifth nationalist military campaign resulted in ‘the communist’s lairs... cleaned up, their Soviet regime destroyed’.[31] With the communist rebellion suppressed, Chiang was able to take a more confrontational approach to the Japanese, leading to the establishment of the Second United Front with the CCP in December 1936. Chiang believed that this agreement was ‘proof that national consciousness has triumphed over all other considerations’.[32] Now that China was internally united, Chiang saw Japan as the ‘final crisis’ and was ready, along with the people, to avenge years of national humiliation.[33] This represents the climax of internal policy that enabled China and Chiang to move to a stance of external aggression, as seen by the start of the Sino-Japanese War in 1937.

In a speech in 1929, Chiang also argued that to achieve a complete revolution in China, he must also concentrate on ‘national and social welfare’ and ‘internal solidarity’.[34] To accomplish this, Chiang also used the period from 1931-37 to unite China under the Three Principles, specifically using themes from the Principle of People’s Livelihood. This principle was used as an attempt to enable the people of China to ‘elevate their standards of living’ through economic modernisation.[35] Robert Stellen notes how Chiang improved the lives of rural peasants through agricultural development in the form of land reform.[36] Chiang also created the New Life Movement in 1934 to reinforce themes of nationalism and modernisation. It intended to arouse discipline and self-control to ‘militarise the lives of the citizens of the entire nation’ in order to cultivate unified action and ideology for soldiers and civilians alike.[37] Chiang described these values as being ‘essential for the success of the military campaigns against the Communist forces’, especially in the success of the fifth campaign, which was depicted as being ’30 percent military, 70 percent political’.[38],[39] Thus, the New Life Movement helped gain popular support for the Nationalist government and create a sense of unity among Chinese citizens, which also played a significant role in the victory over the Communists. Thus, Chiang not only used military campaigns to defeat the communists but also to establish a new China based on the nationalist ideals of democracy and freedom. Furthermore, the focus on creating a unified Chinese ideology gives a strong depiction of how Chiang’s development of the Nationalist revolution outweighed his desire to defeat the Japanese between 1931-37.

In conclusion, this essay has shown that an ineffective internationalist policy, a gulf in strength between China and Japan and a prioritisation of internal pacification led Chiang Kai-Shek to pursue a policy of appeasement in the years 1931-37. These three factors however were all driven by the legacy of Sun-Yat Sen, his Three Principles and the overriding final nationalist goal of Chinese unification. This can clearly be seen within Chiang’s personal directives to fight a diplomatic war with Japan, with aid from the League of Nations, invoking The Principle of Nationalism. Furthermore, The Principle of Democracy can be seen in the five campaigns undertaken to eradicate communism from China, personally undertaken by Chiang with the belief that only a single-party Kuomintang government would be able to truly unite China. It must also be said that the creation of the New Life Movement also reiterated themes seen within the Principle of People’s Livelihood. It was only at the climax of Japanese expansionism in 1937 in the Marco-Polo Bridge incident, along with Chiang’s belief that a united national consciousness had been created in China, that was Chiang willing to explore a move to external aggression. Thus, Chiang’s pursuit of appeasement with Japan can be explained as a continuation of the Nationalist Revolution in China.

Bibliography:

Primary Sources:

Chiang Kai-Shek, China’s Destiny, (Dennis Dobson LTD, London, 1947)

Chaing Kai-Shek, ‘The Goal of the Revolution and the Importance of Cooperation’ in Wang T Tig, General Chiang Kai Shek: The Builder of New China, (1929)

Chiang Kai-Shek, ‘Manifesto to the People’ in Wang T Tig, General Chiang Kai Shek: The Builder of New China, (1929)

Chiang Kai-Shek, Double Tenth Speech, (October 10, 1934), ON CHIANG KAI-SHEK'S SPEECH ON THE DOUBLE TENTH FESTIVAL (marxists.org)

Chiang Chung Cheng, Soviet Russia in China: A Summing Up at Seventy, Farrar, Strauss and Cudahy, (1957)

Sun Yat-Sen. The International Development of China. Shanghai: The Commercial Press, Ltd., (1922)

Secondary Sources:

Bedeski, Robert E. “Pre-Communist State Building in Modern China: The Political Thought of Chiang Kai-Shek”, Asian Perspective, Vol.4, No.2, (1980)

Coble, Parks M. “Chiang Kai-Shek and the Anti-Japanese Movement in China: Zou Tao-Fen and the National Salvation Association, 1931-1937.” The Journal of Asian Studies 44, no. 2 (1985)

Cohen, Warren, ‘American Leaders and East Asia, 1931-1938’, Americans, Chinese and Japanese Perspectives in Wartime Asia, (2013)

Commire, Anne, ‘Historic World Leaders’, Vol. 1, (1994), 90; The World Book Encyclopedia, Vol. 3, Chicago: World Book, (2009)

Gordon, David M, ‘Historiographical Essay: The China-Japan War, 1931-45, The Journal of Military History, Vol.70, No.1 (2006)

Lee, Edward Bing-Shuey, “The Three Principles of the Kuomintang.” The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science 152 (1930)

So Wai. Chor, “The Making of the Guomindang’s Japan Policy, 1932-1937: The Roles of Chiang Kai-Shek and Wang Jingwei.” Modern China 28, no. 2 (2002)

Stellen, Robert W. “Chiang Kai-Shek: A Study in Political Personality”, II Politico, Vol.39, No.3, (1974)

Taylor, Jay, The Generalissimo Chiang Kai-Shek and the Struggle for Modern China, Chapter 3: The Nanking Decade, Harvard University Press, (2009)

Teh-Kuang Chang, “Chiang Kai-Shek and World Peace”, Journal of Chinese Studies, Vol.3, No.2, (1986)

Youli Sun, ‘China’s International Approach to the Manchurian Crisis’, 1931-1933.” Journal of Asian History 26, no. 1 (1992)

[1] Youli Sun, ‘China’s International Approach to the Manchurian Crisis’, 1931-1933.” Journal of Asian History 26, no. 1 (1992), 48 [2] Teh-Kuang Chang, “Chiang Kai-Shek and World Peace”, Journal of Chinese Studies, Vol.3, No.2, (1986), 227 [3] Chiang Kai-Shek, ‘Manifesto to the People’ in Wang T Tig, General Chiang Kai Shek: The Builder of New China, (1929) [4] Ibid [5] Sun, ‘China’s International Approach to the Manchurian Crisis’, 47 [6] Chaing Kai-Shek, ‘The Goal of the Revolution and the Importance of Cooperation’ in Wang T Tig, General Chiang Kai Shek: The Builder of New China, (1929), 57 [7] Chiang Kai-Shek, China’s Destiny, (Dennis Dobson LTD, London, 1947), 133 [8] Sun, ‘China’s International Approach to the Manchurian Crisis’, 56 [9] Chang, “Chiang Kai-Shek and World Peace”, 227 [10] Sun, ‘China’s International Approach to the Manchurian Crisis’, 71 [11] Ibid, 57 [12] Ibid, 53 [13] Warren Cohen, ‘American Leaders and East Asia, 1931-1938’, Americans, Chinese and Japanese Perspectives in Wartime Asia, (2013), 16 [14] David M. Gordon, ‘Historiographical Essay: The China-Japan War, 1931-45, The Journal of Military History, Vol.70, No.1 (2006), 145 [15] Chiang Chung Cheng, Soviet Russia in China: A Summing Up at Seventy, Farrar, Strauss and Cudahy, (1957), 241 [16] Sun, ‘China’s International Approach to the Manchurian Crisis’, 73 [17] Ibid [18] Chiang Kai-Shek, China’s Destiny, 133 [19] Jay Taylor, The Generalissimo Chiang Kai-Shek and the Struggle for Modern China, Chapter 3 : The Nanking Decade, (Harvard University Press, 2009), 99 [20] Chiang Kai-Shek, China’s Destiny, 133 [21]Chiang Chung Cheng, Soviet Russia in China, 210 [22] Ibid, 312 [23] Anne Commire, ‘Historic World Leaders’, Vol. 1 (Detroit: Gale Research, 1994), 90; The World Book Encyclopedia, Vol. 3 (Chicago: World Book, 2009), 94 [24] Parks M. Coble, “Chiang Kai-Shek and the Anti-Japanese Movement in China: Zou Tao-Fen and the National Salvation Association, 1931-1937.” The Journal of Asian Studies 44, no. 2 (1985), 293 [25] Taylor, The Generalissimo Chiang Kai-Shek,112 [26] Chaing Kai-Shek, ‘Manifesto to the People’ in Wang T Tig, General Chiang Kai Shek: The Builder of New China, (1929) [27] Sun Yat-Sen. The International Development of China. (Shanghai: The Commercial Press, Ltd., 1922), 96 [28] Robert E. Bedeski, “Pre-Communist State Building in Modern China: The Political Thought of Chiang Kai-Shek”, Asian Perspective, Vol.4, No.2, (1980), 154 [29] So Wai. Chor, “The Making of the Guomindang’s Japan Policy, 1932-1937: The Roles of Chiang Kai-Shek and Wang Jingwei.” Modern China 28, no. 2 (2002): 245 [30] Ibid, 227 [31] Chiang Chung Cheng, Soviet Russia in China, 208 [32] Chiang Chung Cheng, Soviet Russia in China, 81 [33] Chiang Kai-Shek, China’s Destiny, 135 [34] Chaing Kai-Shek, ‘The Goal of the Revolution and the Importance of Cooperation’, 53 [35] Edward Bing-Shuey Lee “The Three Principles of the Kuomintang.” The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science 152 (1930): 265 [36] Robert W. Stellen, “Chiang Kai-Shek: A Study in Political Personality”, II Politico, Vol.39, No.3, (1974), 439 [37] Taylor, The Generalissimo Chiang Kai-Shek ,108 [38] Chiang Kai-Shek, Double Tenth Speech, (October 10, 1934), ON CHIANG KAI-SHEK'S SPEECH ON THE DOUBLE TENTH FESTIVAL (marxists.org) [39] Chiang Chung Cheng, Soviet Russia in China, 64