Bismarck and German Unification

Portrait of Otto von Bismarck c.1875

Introduction

In 1862, Otto von Bismarck advocated “The great questions of the day will not be settled by

means of speeches and majority decisions, but by iron and blood’.[1] By 1871, Germany was unified. In the histography of today, Bismarck is seen as the mastermind behind the emergence of the German Empire. Bismarck’s management of the economy is assessed in the first section of the essay. Ian Mitchell and John Breuilly argue that Bismarck inherited a strong economy due to an economic boom and profited off Prussian monetary experts. The assimilation of Germany to a breeding ground for nationalisation will be discussed in the following section: David Bell and Ian Cawood claim Bismarck instigated German nationalism, then unification, through war, whereas Jonathan Steinburg suggests unification was an inevitable consequence of a rise in German nationalism. The diplomatic activity of Bismarck will be discussed in the final section, as Mitchell concludes that Bismarck’s most important trait was that he was a master diplomat, whilst Lemieux claimed Bismarck was fortunate to a large extent.

Chapter One: The Prussian Economy

Arguably, Bismarck did not contribute to the economic influences that led to the unification of Germany. Ian Mitchell claims Bismarck’s military victories would have been much less likely without the economic growth from 1850 to 1870, expressing that the period was ‘two decades of economic boom’.[2] The Zollverein, a customs union organised in 1834 had earlier removed most internal tariffs in the German states and became an economic power once the coalmines in the Ruhr expanded.[3] A Prussian report from the early 1850s supports this view and stated that ‘furnaces rise one after the other and light up the region’ and that ‘eighteen new societies for mining had been formed’. [4] This report focuses specifically on the Rhineland, an area under Prussian territory at the time, meaning it gives a credible view as to how Prussia gained material resources. In this period of economic boom, from 1860 to 1870, Mitchell adds that coal production doubled from 17 million tons to 37 million tons which increases the reliability of the report and thus Mitchell’s main argument that the economy was a potent aspect of German unification.[5] An increase in resources enabled mass production, as shown by the Krupp armaments factory in Essen which employed 8,000 men.[6] Alfred Krupp would personally address his workers to build the “maximum number of shells… on the largest conceivable scale’.[7] The impact of ‘coal and iron’ effectively created the wealth of the Prussian state required to finance three wars within a six-year period.

Interestingly, Mitchell more convincingly argues the economic boom enabled greater technological advancements and a capacity to produce new weapons. At the Battle of Sedan in 1970, Mitchell notes how the ‘superior firepower’ of the Prussians devastated the French troops, effectively destroying the whole cavalry unit.[8] The Krupp C64 field gun was able to outrange and outfire its French counterparts, with a 2000m longer maximum range. Months later, during the bombardment of Paris, a correspondent of the London Daily News described the artillery as brutes, stating how French troops were slain, ‘slaughtered by missiles of terrible weight, shattered into fragments’.[9] Mitchell continues that it was the railways, rather than factories that were the main large-scale enterprises throughout this period. By the time of German unification, Prussia had 17,000km of Railway within her territories, which was triple that of 1860.[10] Railway construction also stimulated revenue and the growth of other industries, such as the mining of coal and iron and cheapened transport costs for textiles and agriculture. It was the German economist Friedrich List who was the leading promoter of railways. One of his supposed uses of the railway system was for the Prussian military, quoted in 1943 as ‘a means of national defence: it facilitates the concentration, distribution and direction of the army’.[11] It is clear, as a leading economic thinker, that he had a large scope of the German economy, specifically in Prussian states, which allowed List to give accurate proposals. The influence of such proposals can be seen over 20 years later in military victories in Austria. In a private conversation, Helmut von Moltke, reviewing his plans to Albrecht von Roon stated, "We have the inestimable advantage of being able to carry our Field Army of 285,000 men over five railway lines and of virtually concentrating them in twenty-five days. ... Austria has only one railway line and it will take her forty-five days to assemble 200,000 men”.[12] This rapid mobilization of Prussian forces meant they had entered enemy territory in both the Austro-Prussian and Franco-Prussian wars before their enemies had completed mobilization. In this respect, Bismarck’s idea, to gain power through ‘blood and iron’, was hugely impacted by the development of the railways. Mitchell convincingly concludes that Bismarck would have struggled to sustain his plans for a Kleindeutsch (the idea of Germany unified without Austria) without the economy growing rapidly in the 1850s and 60s.

Conversely, Bismarck’s financial manipulations showed it was not only the economic boom that enabled Bismarck to achieve his aims. Along with ‘coal and iron’, Mitchell wrote of a new formula: ‘gold and Iron’.[13] Unwilling to raise state taxes, Bismarck’s personal banker, Gerson Bleichröder proposed an idea that the state should sell its rights without violating a law, primarily through an arrangement with the Cologne-Minden railway. It eventually did so, paying for an ‘entire campaign’.[14] Bleichröder further administered ‘gold’ from German states who had opposed Prussia in 1866, using it later as bribes to gain support for unification. It does not seem controversial to suggest that Bismarck relied on economic experts to aid his goal. In fact, Bismarck later commented that he was ashamed to ‘understand so little on the subject’ (of political economy).[15] Rather, the aspects of iron, coal, and gold, alongside Bismarck, all played their part in German unification.

John Breuilly further suggested there are only indirect links between the economy and unification. Whilst economic conditions were ‘favourable’, Breuilly saw the economic growth in Prussia not as an anomaly, but rather an occurrence that was taking place across Europe.[16] By 1870, despite a larger population, Germany produced only 38 million tons of coal compared to 118 million in Britain.[17] Furthermore, the GNP per Capita showed no significant growth for Germany compared to other European powers.[18] Despite this, the charts used only present the whole of Germany which does not give an accurate representation of Prussia alone. Furthermore, Breuilly states France also experienced growth in its economy but never capitalised upon opportunities as it failed to spend on modernising its army. William McElwee adds that Prussia had an ‘immediate army of 370,000 men, which would grow to nearly 1 million’.[19] Opposingly, France was unable to prepare quickly enough before the war started, as the planned 1,200,000-man army ended up chaotic and unorganised. Breuilly provides a viable view that Prussia was not an anomaly for economic growth across Europe. Rather, it was this economic growth that made Prussian dominion of non-Austrian Germany sustainable. For Breuilly, the sound economy enabled Prussia to go to war with France and Austria and the success of unification depended on these military victories.

To conclude, Bismarck was strengthened by the rapid development of the economy from 1850, a view in which Mitchell agrees that coal and steel also played a part in unification. As a result of greater production, it not only allowed for mass weapons production but more significantly improvements in railways, as List and von Moltke convincingly state. Furthermore, Mitchell adds that the economic manipulations of Bleichröder showed efforts for unification to be not only based on steel and coal but also through bribes with gold, which showed Bismarck profited from employing influential and capable men to run the economy. As a result, the economy, as the Bismarck quote suggests, added steel to aid Bismarck’s aim for unification but as Mitchell strongly states, gold and coal were also pivotal for the success of Bismarck. Thus, the economic consensus shows Bismarck greatly profited from the strong economic position from which he adopted Prussia.

Chapter Two: Diplomatic Policy

Bismarck also contributed strongly to the growing sense of nationalism within Germany in the 1860s. Whilst Bismarck personally never identified with any cause, be it German nationalism or the monarchy, David Bell and Ian Cawood claim that Bismarck completed ‘the goal for which he was striving, a will for power which came from uniting Germany through war’.[20] Whilst the liberals dreamt of uniting Germany through ‘moral conquests’, Bismarck understood that for Germany to unite, it had to come from the ‘iron force of economic power’ and ‘the bloody victory of war’.[21] Bismarck was also a shrewd tactician and always played his hand to great effect, first seen in the Dano-Prussian War of 1963. At this point, Bismarck was, in his own words, ‘closer to the gallows than to the throne’ because of his unpopular political methods.[22] The new King of Denmark, Christian IX, provided Bismarck with justification to start a war in 1963 and garner support for Prussian expansionism. It was sparked over the Schleswig-Holstein Question of which the 1963 November Constitution, tying the duchy of Schleswig more closely to the Danish Kingdom and viewed by the German side as a violation of the 1953 London Protocol (which affirmed that Schleswig would have no greater constitutional affinity to Denmark than Holstein did). For Bismarck, this opportunity gained support for his increased military spending for if the liberals were to vote against funding amid war, it would appear wholly unpatriotic. Success in the Danish War was the first of a series of wars that came to change the map of Europe. Bismarck further manipulated events with Austria, to pressure her into the Austro-Prussian War of 1866. Austrian ambassador Count Karolyi sent a dispatch stating that Prussian public opinion was sensitive to the Austrian issue and there was no doubt that ‘…the danger by public opinion formed an essential part of the calculations and actions of Count Bismarck [who considered] the annexation of the Duchies ... a matter of life and death for his political existence [and wished] to make it appear such for Prussia too’.[23] This dispatch presented that Bismarck was willing to convince the public to make it appear that Austria endangered the survival of Prussia. Tension over the territorial spoils from their victory over Denmark spilt over in 1866 into a full-blown war as Bismarck called on the spirit of the 1848 revolutionaries, using German nationalism in a struggle to replace Austrian hegemony in Germany with that of Prussia. Bismarck authored that ‘We aim, at least in North Germany at that position which the National Constitution of 1849 had intended for the central authority’.[24] These revolutionary tactics earned him praise from even his bitterest political opponents. Friedrich Engels praised Bismarck’s tactics in 1866, understanding that the German civil war for what it really was, ‘namely a revolution’, thus emerging as the champion of the oppressed peoples of the Austrian Empire.[25] Arguably, Bismarck’s masterpiece was the ultimate humiliation of France after victory in the Franco-Prussian War. Bismarck choreographed the Hall of Mirrors at Versailles as the location for King Wilhelm’s coronation as German emperor. This represented the crowning glory of his political life, the unification of Germany under Berlin’s rule.

One must concede the roles of Chief of the General Staff Helmuth Von Moltke and War Minister Albrecht von Roon were vital for Bismarck’s military success. Alfred von Schlieffen authors there were ‘5 perfect institutions in Europe; Prussia’s was its general staff’.[26] The existence of this general staff ensured a smooth chain of command and control, meaning Prussian operations were controlled at a remarkable speed. With technological advancements such as the breech-loaded infantry rifle, Moltke noted that ‘strategy must become offensive… tactics defensive’.[27] He also placed an emphasis on maintaining contact between subordinate and superior command and initiated the system of ‘general directives’ in place of rigid ‘operational orders’. These changes meant ‘occasional mistakes were usually corrected before they became disasters’.[28] Roon claimed that Bismarck ‘would not be in the place he is now without me’ as Bismarck sent Roon’s reforms through parliament in 1859-60.[29] Roon’s reorganization of the army gave Prussia a larger wartime army with more ample reserves. It expanded the army to 200,000 men, with the Landwehr (reserves) absorbed into active regiments. As a result, Roon provided Bismarck with an army that could survive a longer war and meet the armies of Austria and France on equal terms. Whilst grand importance of aid was required from other Prussian officials, von Roon further added that he could ‘never replace’ Bismarck and refused to downplay the political influence of the master statesman. Furthermore, in all major battles of the Austro and Franco-Prussian wars, the ‘Prussians fought against equal or higher numbers.[30] Thus, Roon’s reorganization enabled Prussia to fight in the Wars of Unification, yet this argument appears limited in explaining how Prussia won them.

Von Moltke once stated the war between Austria was a ‘long, foreseen struggle’ and a way to consolidate Prussian power and inevitable rather than a means to an end for unification.[31] This struggle for German nationalism, as von Moltke adds, had been growing throughout Germany in the mid-nineteenth century, as authored by the poet Heinrich Heine, who wrote, ‘…. a daughter, beautiful as liberty, then the censor grabs his red pencil and strikes out the word liberty’.[32] This piece, written after the Napoleonic era, showed how Germans felt liberty had dissapeared, as liberal thinkers risked jobs to write prose relating to the loss of freedom and national identity. In 1848, German politician Johann Gustav Droysen stated that Austrian power meant a lack of power to Prussia and its goal for Germany ‘is destructive’. [33] He added that unification in Germany was inevitable, and it was Prussia herself rather than Bismarck who desired German unity. The extent of the desire for self-determination was backed by the German revolutions in 1848, where mainly students and intellectuals participated in revolts, requesting a national German Parliament.[34] Thus, even years before Bismarck came into power, Germany began to assimilate into a patriotic nation.

Bell and Cawood show that Bismarck intended to gain power through war and there is significant evidence to show that he used political machinations to exploit foreign relations, significantly his political machinations to bring Denmark and Austria into war. Bismarck was not the instigator of nationalism in Germany however, which Steinburg and Von Moltke more convincingly show had been building up from the early 18th century under the control of the French and then in competition with Austria. This view that nationalisation had been building, first shown in the 1848/49 revolutions, gives a stronger and clearer view that Bismarck’s domestic policies and foreign machinations were able to further these views, so far as to unify Germany.

Chapter Three: Master Politician

The last theme examines the effect of Bismarck’s diplomatic activity leading up to unification in 1871. Bismarck was an opportunist and was able to skilfully interpret unseen events and capitalise on chances to gain power for Prussia. Bismarck’s instigation of the Franco-Prussian war through political machinations demonstrates this point. Bismarck drew France into war by modifying a report of King Wilhelm I based on the meeting between Wilhelm and Count Vincent Benedetti, named the Ems Dispatch. On July 13, 1970, Bismarck released this report to the public, removing Wilhelm’s phrases and editing language to a more confrontational nature, such as the line “I shall obligate myself for all future time never again to give my approval to the candidacy of the Hohenzollerns”, which was edited to “the demand to authorize him to telegraph to Paris that His Majesty the King would obligate himself for all future time never again to give his approval to the candidacy of the Hohenzollerns”, emphasising that the French had made the above demands under pain of war.[35] Released to the public, this showed that Bismarck aimed to gain support against the French which would unite Germany closer. On July 19, mere days later, Napoleon III declared war to Bismarck’s delight, showing this dispatch was the key instigator. It was only the quarrel with France that finally overcame the resistance of the South Germans opposed to unification, which is contributed by Bismarck who adds “the gulf… could not be more effectively bridged than by a common national war against the neighbouring nation, our aggressor for centuries”.[36] Published after his chancellorship, writing this book allows Bismarck to use hindsight to reflect on his policies for unification, showing how he felt that unification through the Franco-Prussian war was the most effective method. This gives the impression that Bismarck was equally as ready to create opportunities as he was to react to those created by others, as seen so significantly by the Franco-Prussian war.

On the opposing side, some scholars suggest Bismarck was politically ‘fortunate’.[37] Bismarck was lucky, states Lemieux that in Austria, there was a large incompetence in generalship, specifically by Ludwig von Benedek at the Battle of Königgrätz. His tactical ineptitude led to a later trialling for ‘military incompetence’. [38] Dierk Walter also notes how in 1866 Austrian leadership, torn by internal strife, ‘surrendered when its field army was still intact and the campaign far from being decided’.[39]As for 1870-71 in France, the Second French Empire was increasingly hated and ‘no longer commanded the unbroken loyalty of its soldiers’.[40] Walter concludes that Prussia did not win the wars of unification, Prussia’s opponents lost them. Yet it must be argued that Bismarck was able to adapt to these favourable situations, from beating an incompetent Austria and an unpopular French Empire to restoring German nationalism through victory. Perhaps what more significantly shows Bismarck’s luck is the non-intervention from Britain. The British ambassador to Prussia, Lord Loftus, sent a report stating that Britain “has nothing to fear from her” and that the success of Bismarck’s policy will maintain the “security and peace of Europe”.[41] Thus, as an influential figure, this almost seems that Loftus and thus Britain is bowing down to greater Prussian power, to protect her own national interest. So, although it gives some strength to Lemieux as it does show convincingly that Prussia was helped in not having to fight Britain, it rejects Lemieux’s idea that Bismarck was lucky. Rather it came down to the growth of Prussian power. The ability of Bismarck as a diplomat was in evidence when Britain, fearing Prussian dominance gave in to demands, as agreed in the Peace of Prague Treaty, were made without “driving beyond the limits”. [42] Lemieux’s claim that Bismarck was lucky seems unconvincing as a reason for unification, as all sources seem to point to the growth of power in Prussia, aided by Bismarck, who aimed to unite through war. Although some incompetence and lack of intervention from Britain aided Bismarck in his aim, Bismarck was able to exploit this with his abilities and strategy as a diplomat.

To conclude, this area shows extensively that Bismarck’s main ability was as a master diplomat. Many of the key events that led to German unification came down to Bismarck’s capitalisation on events, most prominently in the Franco-Prussian war, where Bismarck used his ability as an opportunist to lure Napoleon and France into a trap of war and consequently bring Germany to the brink of unification. Despite claims from Lemieux that Bismarck was fortunate, other sources suggest that Bismarck’s military victories became easier due to enemy incompetence, Bismarck was an opportunist and worked depending on the situation, which through the period, favoured a figure like himself. As a result, this theme shows to a great extent that Bismarck contributed to unification through his unique way of politics.

Conclusion

In conclusion, Bismarck’s political ability as a master diplomat contributed most significantly to the unification of Germany, whereas his contributions to the economy and nationalism were less significant, yet still positive. Regarding economic factors to unification, the economic boom in the 1850s abetted Bismarck’s capability to wage war successfully, due to advancements in railways and to a lesser extent weaponry. Experts such as Bleichröder and List provided a strong economic position for Bismarck to profit from, which showed whereas Bismarck saw “Iron and Blood” as the key to success, it was also down to coal and steel. Although evidence can be drawn to conclude Bismarck used the economic power of Prussia to his advantage, the rise of Prussia as an economic giant occurred prior to Bismarck. Similarities are shown between this aspect and the rise of nationalism in Germany, to combine and unify Germany in common thought, in that it had been building up before Bismarck’s period in power. This nationalistic assimilation had started as early as the revolutions in 1848, far out of Bismarck’s period of influence. Although it seems credible to suggest that Bismarck was able to gain strong support through war, this aspect of German unification sprouted from events and figures preceding Bismarck. Most notable to Bismarck’s contribution to unification however was his ability as a diplomat, in which his awareness to capitalise on unseen events was vital. Bismarck’s nature as an opportunist can clearly be seen in the waging of war with France, as Bismarck was able to instigate a war on his terms, leading to a complete German unification. It is clear through all three areas that Bismarck knew his role to a tee, he evaluated economic and political situations flawlessly, using sheer force of personality or flexibility of principle. This leads one to conclude that it is to a significant extent that Bismarck was the main cause of unification, and was able to achieve the impossible.

Bibliography:

Bairoch, Paul, a Chart on GNP (at market prices) in millions of 1960 US dollars, Economics and World History, 281, table 4; 295, table 10

Bell, David, From Poacher to Gamekeeper, Modern History Review, 1999

Bismarck, Otto von, Reflections and Reminiscences, 1898

Breuilly, John, The First German Unification, Modern History Review, 1996

Buk-Swienty, Tom Dommedag Als, 2010

Dredger, John, Tactics and Procurement in the Habsburg Military, 1866-1918: Offensive Spending, 2017

Droysen, J. G., https://sourcebooks.fordham.edu/mod/germanunification.asp, Speech to the Frankfurt Assembly: 1848

Engels, Friedrich, The Role of Force in History, 1968

Heine, Heinrich, Prose and Poetry, 258

List, Fredrich quoted in Lalor, John J., Cyclopædia of Political Science (1881)

Lord Augustus Loftus, Assessment of German Affairs, 1866, http://germanhistorydocs.ghi-dc.org/sub_document.cfm?document_id=1815

Lemieux, Simon Bismarck’s Foreign Policy 1862-71: By Design or Default

Mitchell, Ian R., Bismarck and the development of Germany, Holmes McDougall Ltd, 1980)

Manchester, William, The Arms of Krupp, 1968

McElwee, William Lloyd, The Art of War: Waterloo to Mons, 1974

Moltke, Helmuth von, https://sourcebooks.fordham.edu/mod/germanunification.asp, 1866

Pollard, Sydney and Holmes, Colin, Documents of European Economic History, vol.1

Robertson, Pricilla, Revolutions of 1848: A Social History, 1952

Robinson, J.H, https://history.hanover.edu/texts/bis.html

Roon, Albrecht von, letter to his friend Clement Theodor Perthes, 1864

Schleiffen, Graf von, Alfred in Foley, Robert, Military Writings, 2002

Snyder, Louis, http://germanhistorydocs.ghidc.org/pdf/eng/505_Orig%20Ed%20Ems%20Dispatch_148.pdf

Steinburg, Jonathan, How did Bismarck do it? History Today, 2011

Stern, Fritz, Gold and Iron: Bismarck, Bleichreoder, and the Building of the German Empire, 1979

Taylor, A.J.P, Bismarck: The Man and the Statesman, 1955

Walter, Dierk, Roon, The Prussian Landwehr, and the reorganization of 1859-1860, War in History, Vol.16, No.3, July 2009

Wolmar, Christian, Blood, Iron and Gold: How the Railways Transformed the World, 2010

[1] J.H, Robinson, Memoirs, https://history.hanover.edu/texts/bis.html, 1 [2] Ian R. Mitchell, Bismarck and the development of Germany, (Holmes McDougall Ltd, 1980), 50-55 [3] A.J.P Taylor, Bismarck: The Man and Statesman, (1955), Bismarck : A.J.P. Taylor : Free Download, Borrow, and Streaming : Internet Archive, 37 [4] A report in Sidney Pollard and Colin Holmes, Documents of European Economic History, vol.1, 478 [5] Mitchell, Bismarck and the development of Germany, 52 [6] Ibid [7] William Manchester, The Arms of Krupp, (1968) in Mitchell, Bismarck and the development of Germany, 41 [8] Mitchell, Bismarck and the development of Germany, 42 [9] William Manchester, The Arms of Krupp, (1968) in Mitchell, Bismarck and the development of Germany, 41 [10] Mitchell, Bismarck and the development of Germany, 50 [11]Friedrich List quoted in John J. Lalor, Cyclopædia of Political Science (1881), 3:118 [12]Helmut von Moltke in Christian Wolmer, Blood, Iron and Gold: How the Railways Transformed the World, (2010), 96 [13] Mitchell, Bismarck and the development of Germany, 54 [14] Albrecht Von Roon in Gold and Iron: Bismarck, Bleichröder, and the Building of the German Empire, (1979), 63 [15] Otto Von Bismarck in A.J.P Taylor, Bismarck: The Man and Statesman, (1955), 181 [16] John Breuilly, The formation of the first German nation-state, 1800-1871, (New York: St Martin’s Press, 1996), 91 [17] Mitchell, Chart comparing Britain and Germany’s economy, Bismarck and the development of Germany, 60 [18]Paul Bairoch, A chart on GNP (at market prices) in millions of 1960 US dollars, Economics and World History, 281, table 4; 295, table 10 [19] William Lloyd McElwee, The Art of War: Waterloo to Mons, (1974) [20] David Bell and Ian Cawood, From Poacher to Gamekeeper, (Modern History Review, 1999), 2-4 [21] AJP Taylor, Bismarck: The Man and the Statesman, (1955), 113 [22] Tom Buk-Swienty, 1964: The Forgotten War that shaped Modern Europe, (2015) [23] Count Karolyi in Stephen Brooks, Nineteenth-Century Europe, (The Macmillan Press Ltd, 1992), 39-40 [24] Otto Von Bismarck in Mitchell, Bismarck and the development of Germany, 27 [25] Friedrich Engels in Bismarck and the Development of Germany, 29 [26] Alfred Graf von Schlieffen, Military Writings, 245 [27] Trevor Dupuy, A Genius for War: The German Army and General Staff; 1897-1945, London: Prentice Hall, (1977), 88-92 [28] Dierk Walter, Roon, The Prussian Landwehr, and the reorganization of 1859-1860, War in History, Vol.16, No.3, (July 2009), 296 [29] Albrecht Von Roon, letter to his friend Clement Theodor Perthes, 1864 [30] Dierk Walter, Roon, 295 [31] Field Marshal Helmuth von Moltke, 1866, https://sourcebooks.fordham.edu/mod/germanunification.asp [32] Heinrich Heine, Prose and Poetry, 258 [33] Johann Gustav Droysen: Speech to the Frankfurt Assembly: 1848, https://sourcebooks.fordham.edu/mod/germanunification.asp [34] Pricilla Robertson, Revolutions of 1848: A Social History, 1952 [35] Ems Dispatch, germanhistorydocs.ghi-dc.org/pdf/.../505_Orig%20Ed%20Ems%20Dispatch_148.pdf [36] Otto Von Bismarck, Reflections and Reminiscences, 361 [37] Simon Lemieux, Simon Bismarck’s Foreign Policy 1862-71: By Design or Default, 27-29 [38] John A. Dredger, Tactics and Procurement in the Habsburg Military, 1866-1918: Offensive Spending, pp 51 [39] Dierk Walter, Roon, The Prussian Landwehr, and the reorganization of 1859-1860, War in History, Vol.16, No.3, (July 2009), 297 [40] Ibid [41] Lord Augustus Loftus, The Diplomatic Reminiscences of Lord Augustus Loftus, Second Series, 1862-1879, 105-108 [42] Simon Lemieux, Simon Bismarck’s Foreign Policy 1862-71: By Design or Default, 29